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Judgment Without Notice: The Unconstitutionality of
Constructive Notice Following Citizens United
CarlissN Chatmad
ABSTRACT

Citizens United v. Federal Election Commission positions a corporation as an
entity entitled to constitutionalrights equal to the rights of naturalpersons. In
many situations, this holding may be the impetus for reform and reconsiderationof
state restrictionson corporaterights that were problematic before the decision. The
operation of corporate statutes on corporationscharteredin one state but doing
business in another state as a foreign corporationis an area in need of this Citizens
United-inspired review. Although most corporations operate as foreign
corporations outside of their state of incorporation, neither the constitutional
validity of corporate withdrawal statutes nor the impact of Citizens United on
proceduraldue process have been determined. This Article is the first to examine
the proceduraldue process implicationsofCitizens United on corporations.
The issue presented by Citizens United is whether the Model Business
CorporationAct ("MBCA") and other corporatestatutes accuratelyreflect the new
level ofequalty between naturalpersons and corporations.Citizens United requires
states to develop a method of service that treats natural persons, domestic
corporations, and foreign corporations equally Due process requires notice of
service on all parties-both natural persons and corporations-reasonably
calculated to result in actual notice of suit in all circumstances. States have,
however, been permitted to impose conditions on foreign corporations that may
not result in actual notice based on the operation of two assumptions: (1) foreign
corporations do not exist within a state's borders until they are admitted to do
business, and (2) because foreign corporations are a creation of the state, a state
may condition foreign corporations'admission within the state's border upon
requirements not imposed on naturalpersons or domestic corporations. State
statutes based on the MBCA require a corporation to indefinitely provide the
Secretary of State with an address where notice of service of process may be
forwarded. Currently, when a corporation fails to comply with the statute, courts
will attributefailure to receive notice to the corporation, subjectingit to a taking of
propertythat violates the corporation'sFourteenthAmendment rights. This Article
' Carliss N. Chatman, Visiting Assistant Professor, Stetson University College of Law. The author
would like to thank Professor Ron Krotzynski for comments on early drafts at the 11th Circuit Legal
Scholarship Forum. She would also like to thank Professor Ellen Podgor and the students in the 2015
Honors Program at Stetson University, as well as Professor Marco Jimenez, Professor James Fox, and
her research assistant Alexander Howell.
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questions why states have been allowed to continue the practice oflimiting the due
process rights of foreign corporations when determining whether constructive
notice is effective, and whether the continued delineation for service of process
purposes between domestic andforeign corporationsis constitutionallyappropriate
following Citizens United. This Article concludes that such disparate treatment is
unconstitutionalfollowing the holding in Citizens United.
A complete elimination of constructive notice on the Secretary of State is the
natural outcome of the application of recentprecedents to the corporatestatutes,
but it is not the best result. Treating a corporation as anything more than an
artilciallegal construct results in legal inequalities that favor the corporation over
the naturalperson. Eliminatingall distinctions may protect the corporateright to
due process, but it also allows corporationsto use withdrawalstatutes to evade legal
responsibility. States have better, constitutionally valid means for service ofprocess
available elsewhere in the MBCA that properly balance the compelling state need
to provide naturalcitizens with a means to serve a withdrawn corporationagainst
the corporation's constitutional rghts. This Article proposes that utilizing an
alternative means ofservice on a withdrawn corporationis a reasonablereform that
complies with the new regulatoryregime createdby Citizens United.
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Imagine the following scenario:
You are born and raised in Delaware. Your lifelong dream of
being admitted to .a university in Boston, Massachusetts, comes
true. Massachusetts requires all out-of-state students to register
with the Secretary of State when they matriculate. As an out-ofstate student, if you leave the state after graduation you must
provide an address where the Secretary of State can forward
service of process for any legal actions arising from activity
conducted while you were a student in the state. You must also
provide the state with an updated address any time you move for
the rest of your life. You are excited to attend the university, so
you comply with the registration requirement.
During your junior year of college, your dorm throws the best
party of the year. You are president of the dorm and serve as its
public face on campus. A few people from off-campus attend,
bringing with them synthetic drugs. Lots of partygoers take the
drugs and have an adverse reaction, but all seem to be fine by
Monday. You believe you are very lucky that no one was hurt
permanently. You go about your remaining time in college
without incident and graduate as scheduled. In compliance with
the statute, you provide the Secretary of State with the address at
your law school in Connecticut before moving.
After law school you move to New York City, but you
disregard the requirement to update your address with the
Secretary of State of Massachusetts. After three years of law
school, you assume the risk of legal action has passed. When you
are in your tenth year of practice (fourteen years after college) you
receive a notice from a collections agency. It states that you have
a default judgment against you in Massachusetts for a tort action
involving permanent brain injuries sustained by one of the
partygoers during your junior year fifteen years ago. The brain
damage could be caused by only the drugs at the dorm party; and
a diagnosis cannot be made without an MRI. Therefore, the
plaintiff was allowed to sue outside of the statute of limitations
for tort actions because he did not discover his injuries until years
later.
The notice of default attaches proof of service in the form of a
certificate from the Massachusetts Secretary of State stating
notice was sent to your address in Connecticut by certified mail.
Although forwarded to Connecticut, you never received notice
because by then you had graduated law school and moved to New
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York. The certificate shows that notice was returned to the
Secretary of State and unclaimed. Your contact information is
easy to locate because you are required to provide New York with
an address to maintain your law license, yet the plaintiff made no
attempts to locate you after service failed. Your attorney advises
you to pay the default judgment. Although it is unconstitutional
and a violation of due process to deprive persons of property
without notice and an opportunity to be heard, the courts have
held that states may condition the admission of non-resident
students to the state upon a consent to service on the Secretary of
State without violating the Constitution.
Thankfully, the scenario above is not the reality for natural persons, as it is a
dear violation of due process rights.' For all defendants in litigation, due process
requires that the defendant be given notice and an opportunity to be heard.2 Parties
may rely on constructive notice, or "notice reasonably calculated, under all the
circumstances, to apprise interested parties of the pendency of the action and afford
them an opportunity to present their objections." Heroic efforts are not required,'
however, notice of suit that relies entirely upon courthouse postings, postings on
property, and other methods that have minimal chance of resulting in notice are
unconstitutional on their own.s If the plaintiff knowingly forwards service to an
address known to be incorrect or to an incorrect person, notice on the natural

' The Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment guarantees that "[n]o State shall ...
deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law . . . ." U.S. CONST. amend.
XIV, § 1. The Due Process clause has substantive and procedural applications. See, e.g., Planned
Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 846-47 (1992). Substantive due process restricts the
government's actions regardless of the procedures used and protects citizens from irrational
governmental classifications and invasion of fundamental rights without a compelling governmental
justification. See, e.g., City of Cuyahoga Falls v. Buckeye Cmty. Hope Found., 538 U.S. 188, 198
(2003); Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 593 (2003) (O'Connor, J., concurring); Daniels v. Williams,
474 U.S. 327, 331 (1986). Procedural due process ensures that a party in litigation is given notice and an
opportunity to be heard. See, e.g., Mullane v. Cent. Hanover Bank & Tr. Co., 339 U.S. 306, 314
(1950); Grannis v. Ordean, 234 U.S. 385, 394 (1914) (citing Louisville & Nashville R.R. Co. v.
Schmidt, 177 U.S. 230, 236 (1990)) ("The fundamental requisite of due process .. . is the opportunity
to be heard.").
2MuSIe; 339 U.S. at 314; Grawnis, 234 U.S. at 394.
3
Mullne, 339 U.S. at 314.
4 Dusenbery v. United States, 534 U.S. 161, 170 (2002).
s See, e.g., Mennonite Bd. of Missions v. Adams, 462 U.S. 791, 799 (1983); Greene v. Lindsey,
456 U.S. 444, 453 (1982); Walker v. Hutchinson, 352 U.S. 112, 116 (1956).
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person fails.' A party with knowledge of both failure and reasonable alternative
means must therefore make additional attempts to serve notice before taking
property by court action.'
The level of effort required by a plaintiff to ensure the defendant actually
receives notice is minimized if the defendant is a foreign corporation.' For
corporations, states must still ensure that notice is reasonably calculated to reach
the defendant.' However, states are allowed to condition a corporation's admission
to do business in a state upon acceptance of terms requiring the corporation to
consent to notice upon the Secretary of State. In so doing, the corporation is
deemed served when the Secretary of State receives notice, not when the
corporation is actually notified of a lawsuit."o This latitude results in scenarios in
which a corporation may be deprived of property without receiving actual notice
and an opportunity to be heard, as is required for natural persons under the
Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process Clause." Thus, foreign corporations may
face the outcome described in the hypothetical above, even when they have
complied with the statute for a reasonable time and when the plaintiff knows of the
foreign corporation's actual address. 12
This discrepancy is further exacerbated for an out-of-state, "foreign,"
corporation that does business in states that have adopted the Model Business
Corporations Act (hereinafter, "MBCA") Under the MBCA withdrawal statute, a
foreign corporation that has ceased doing business in a state must file a certificate
of withdrawal as well as consent to service on the Secretary of State.13 States that
have adopted a version of the MBCA require a corporation to update the address

6 See Jones v. Flowers, 547 U.S. 220, 225 (2006); Mullane, 339 U.S. at 318. In
lowers, the
homeowner prevailed in a suit against the county commissioner alleging taking of property without due
process. Fowers, 547 U.S. at 239. The commission mailed notices, which were returned on two
occasions unclaimed, then posted notice by publication. Id. at 223-24. The Court held Jones' failure to
comply with statutory obligations does not result in an automatic restriction of his due process rights. Id.
at 232-34. Instead, parties with notice of failure must take additional reasonable measures when
alternatives are available. Id. at 234. Although lowers is a case of a governmental taking, it is
illustrative of the attitude of the court towards individual due process.
7 Mowers, 547 U.S. at 225.
" See, e.g., Washington ex rel. Bond & Goodwin & Tucker v. Superior Court of Wash., 289 U.S.
361, 365 (1933).
9 Id. at 365-66.
s0 See MODEL Bus. CORP. ACT § 15.20(c) (2010); see also discussion infra § 1.C; infra notes 236240 and accompanying text.
" Courts have held that because the corporation is required by statute to provide an address for
forwarding service, if service fails because of the corporation's failure to comply with statutes, it remains
liable for a default judgment. See discussion infra Section I. C.; infra notes 236-240 and accompanying
text. This result contradicts the Court's holding in Flowers. See infra notes 222-228 and accompanying
text.
12 Foreign corporations are corporations incorporated or chartered out of state. See Note, Foreign
Corporations-StateBoundaries for NationalBusiness, 59 YALE L.J. 737, 737 (1950).
13 MODEL Bus. CORP. ACT § 15.20(a) (2010).
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on file indefinitely and face the consequences of any failure to update.14 If a
withdrawn foreign corporation fails to receive notice because the Secretary of State
forwards it to the last address on file instead of that corporation's actual address,
the impact of the error-a default judgment-falls completely on the defendant.s
This is the case even when the plaintiff knows that the corporation's principal place
of business or home office address differs from the address on file with the
Secretary of State." Such an outcome is not possible when serving process on
natural persons or domestic corporations."
The intent of the withdrawal statutes is to prevent a corporation from
withdrawing from a state and evading liability by failing to update its address with
the Secretary of State. 8 In this modern era of internet search engines, electronic
filings with federal agencies, and corporate websites, however, the withdrawal
statutes instead act to reward a willfully ignorant plaintiff or a plaintiff with uncleanhands who knowingly relies on the Secretary of State's knowledge of the defendant
corporation's address when more accurate company information is available."
Courts have found this disparate treatment to be constitutional based on the
premise that a corporation does not exist within a state until it is granted admission
to that state, and therefore, the state may condition admission upon compliance
with the state's corporate statutes.20 Modern conditions combined with recent
precedent compel states and courts to rethink and reform this premise.21
There has been little discussion of how recent expansions of corporate
constitutional rights and increased recognition of corporations as persons as a result
of the Citizens United decision impact the relationship of corporations to
individuals in the courts.22 The holdings in Citizens United and Hobby Lobby
1Id.; see alsoinfra Section III.A.

STankard-Smith, Inc. Gen. Contractors v. Thursby, 663 S.W.2d 473, 476 (Tex. App. 1983)
(holding the defendant responsible for the default judgment).
16 Autodynamics, Inc. v. Vervoot, No. 14-10-00021-CV, 2011 WL 1260077, at *5-6 (Tex. App.
Apr. 5, 2011) (holding that because there is no statutory requirement that the plaintiff provide the
nonresident's address for service under the Code, a plaintiff is not required to serve defendant at an
address other than the address registered with the Secretary of State, even if the plaintiff knows the
defendant has moved).
17 Domestic corporations are only subjected to substitute service if service on the registered agent
fails. In that circumstance, service is made on the secretary of the corporation at the principal place of
business. See, e.g., MODEL. Bus. CORP. ACT § 5.04(b) (2010).
1
sSeeMODEL BUS. CORP. ACT. § 15.20 (2010).
' See discussion infra Sections III.A., III.B.
20 See discussion infra Section II.B.
21 See discussion infra Section 111.C.
2 Professor Michalski notes that "[c]ourts . . . have overlooked that the expansion of corporate
rights entails the expansion of corporate obligations, including the obligation to submit to the
jurisdiction of the right-granting forum." See Roger M. Michalski, Rghts Come with Responsibilties:
PersonalJurisdiction in the Age of Corporate Personhood, 50 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 125, 127 (2013)
(footnote omitted). Per Professor Michalski's analysis, when considering court issues, the courts focus
on justice, not corporate responsibility, and this focus is misplaced. See id. at 150.

56

KENTUCKY LAWJOURNAL

Vol. 105

require the elimination of distinctions between constitutional "persons," regardless
of how corporate rights are assigned during chartering." States must now view the
corporation and the natural person equally when analyzing constitutional limits on
state authority.24 States must look to the nature of the right, not to the party
exercising the right.2 5 Since individuals may not be served without adequate
notice,26 Citizens United should be read to hold that a corporation cannot be
required to consent to being "deemed served" as a result of service upon a
government entity merely by the corporation's inaction.27 The likelihood of such a
holding is reinforced by the HobbyLobby decision.28
Although most corporations operate as foreign corporations outside of their
state of incorporation, neither the constitutional validity of withdrawal statutes nor
the impact of Citizens United on procedural due process have been examined. The
issue presented by Citizens United is whether the MBCA and other corporate
statutes accurately reflect the new level of equality between natural persons and
corporations. This Article questions whether constructive notice on foreign
corporations in general is constitutional following the Court's holdings in Citizens
United and Hobby Lobby.29 This Article also questions whether state withdrawal
statutes infringe upon corporate Fourteenth Amendment rights by requiring
perpetual updating, which results in a corporation's failure to receive actual notice. 30
While recognizing that states still retain the right to police and govern
corporations, this Article concludes that the failure of a corporation to receive
notice in certain circumstances renders these statutes unconstitutional."' States have
alternative and effective means for serving foreign corporations following
withdrawal while protecting their interests; therefore, this Article recommends that
states utilize service requirements found elsewhere in corporate law statutes to meet
the requirements of Citizens United.32
Part I of this Article lays the foundation for exploring and rethinking these
rights by canvassing the history of corporate due process rights, including how
service of process obligations have been defined by the states and interpreted by the
courts." Part I also asserts that the intersection of states' rights and corporate
personhood has resulted in the development of corporate statutes that have always

' Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310, 349-57 (2010); Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, 134 S.
Ct. 2751, 2768-69 (2014).
24 See Citizens United, 558 U.S. at 349-57.
25 See Citizens United, 558 U.S. at 349-57; see also infra notes 163-170 and accompanying text.
26 See infra notes 222-228 and accompanying
text.
27 See discussion infra Section II.A.
28 See discussion infra Section
II.B.
29 See discussion infra Part I.
' See discussion infrs Part II.
31 See discussion infra Part III.
2 See discussion infra Section III. C.
22 See discussion infra Part I.
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been on the brink of being unconstitutional.34 Courts have permitted states to draw
distinctions between domestic and foreign corporations and to condition mere
access to the forum upon a corporation's surrendering its rights. Going forward, a
state may not be able to treat a foreign corporation as it treats a foreign nation,
when that corporation is made up of individual citizens vested with constitutional
rights that do not disappear when they aggregate as a corporation. 35
Part II of this Article proposes that if the holding in Citizens United is
followed, state statutes that require a corporation to consent to constructive notice,
and that do not have a likelihood of alerting the corporation of pending suits
against it, are not constitutional.1 6 A question inspired by Citizens United is
whether corporations must be given due process rights equal to that of natural
persons in the form of actual notice of service." Whether the withdrawal statute
and updating service of process requirements violate a corporate person's due
process rights turns on whether corporations are deserving of constitutional rights
generally." If corporations are "persons" for purposes of constitutional rights, those
rights must be applied equally." Part II concludes that corporations are persons;
therefore, the Citizens United and HobbyLobby personhood requirements should
be expanded to encompass a corporation's Fourteenth Amendment rights to
adequate notice.' States must apply a constructive notice statute to foreign
corporations with requirements and results equal to the statutory impact on natural
persons and domestic corporations.
Part III of this Article considers how the application of Citizens United to
corporate Fourteenth Amendment rights renders substitute service on foreign
corporations, as it is defined in the MBCA, unconstitutional.41 Through an
examination of MBCA withdrawal provisions, Part III explores the dynamics of
the changes Citizens Unitedand HobbyLobbyhave made to corporate due process
rights, proposing that the holdings require states to review and reform corporate
statutes.42 By applying the same notice standards used for service of process on

See discussion infra Section I. C
This expression of the theory of the firm known as the aggregate theory is found in both Citizens
Unitedand HobbyLobby. See infra note 50 and accompanying text.
- See discussion infrs Section II.A.
37 See Citizens United, 558 U.S. at 338-41. The Court disregarded the distinction between
corporations, natural persons, and citizens; instead, the Citizens United majority proclaimed that states
must look to the underlying nature of the right, not to the party exercising the right. If rights do not
change based on the nature of the party exercising the right, Citizens United inspires an inquiry into
how other rights may be impacted by equality.
* See discussion infra Section I.A.
19 See infra note 37 and accompanying text..
40 See discussion infrs Section II.B.
" See discussion infra Section III.A.
42 See discussion infra Section II.B.
3
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domestic corporations, states may bring the statutes into compliance with the
precedents.43
This Article also questions why states have been allowed to continue to limit
the due process rights of corporations when determining whether constructive
notice is effective, and whether the continued delineation for service of process
purposes between domestic and foreign corporations is constitutional following
Citizens United' Following the holdings in Citizens Unitedand HobbyLobby to
their natural conclusions results in a finding that the withdrawal service provisions
found in MBCA statutes are unconstitutional.4 5 If states are required by Citizens
United to treat corporations and natural persons equally, then the withdrawal
statutes that draw distinctions between domestic corporations, foreign
corporations, and natural persons infringe on corporate constitutional rights. States
must now view the corporation and the natural person equally when analyzing
constitutional limits on state authority.
I. HISTORICAL SERVICE OF PROCESS FOR CORPORATIONS
Citizens United is not the first case in which the Court extended corporate
rights without a clear constitutional justification. 6 The expansion of Fourteenth
Amendment rights to corporations is an old trend, starting with Santa Clara v.
Southern Pacific Rail Road Company in 1886.47 The Court has taken several
approaches to expanding these corporate rights. First, by protecting the corporate
rights vis-i-vis property granted in state-issued corporate charters.48 Second, by
See discussion infra Section III.C
See discussion infra Section II.A.
See discussion infra Section III.B.
4 See David Ciepley, Neither Persons nor Associations: Against Constitutional Rights for
Corporations, 1 J.L. & CTS. 221, 223 (2013) (explaining that in Santa Clara, the Court never offered a
sustainable argument as to why corporations have constitutional rights); Carl J. Mayer, Personalizingthe
Impersonal: Corporationsand the Bill of Rights, 411 HASTINGS LJ. 577, 581-82 (1990). Prior to
Citizens United, the courts recognized that corporations have First Amendment rights to freedom of
speech and freedom of the press, Fifth Amendment protection from unreasonable takings, Fourth
Amendment protection from unreasonable search and seizure, and Fourteenth Amendment rights to
equal protection. See First Nat'1 Bank of Bos. v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 774, 778 n.14 (1978) (First
Amendment); Hale v. Henkel, 201 U.S. 43, 76 (1906) (Fourth Amendment); Mo. Pac. Ry. Co. v.
Nebraska, 164 U.S. 403, 410 (1896) (Fifth Amendment); Santa Clara v. S. Pac. R.R. Co., 118 U.S.
394, 396 (1886) (Fourteenth Amendment).
47 See Santa Clara, 118 U.S. 394.
" This premise is known as the artificial entity or concession theory. The artificial entity theory
envisions corporations as state approved entities, which exist at the pleasure of the government, are noncorporeal, and may be subject to more extensive regulation than a natural person due to this privileged
position. See William W. Bratton Jr., The New Economic Theory of the Firm: CriticalPerspectives
from History, 41 STAN. L. REv. 1471, 1475 (1989) (describing that the concession/artificial entity
theory comes in degrees: a strong version attributes the existence of the corporation to state sponsorship;
the weaker version sets up state permission as a regulatory prerequisite to doing business). Under this
theory, the corporation has rights only incidental to the corporate charter.
4
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analogizing the corporation itself to "persons."4 9 Third, by finding that the
corporate person's rights are derived from the rights of the association of citizens
who have united in the corporate form.s0 Those persons do not lose their rights
simply because they operate through a separate entity.s"
The Fourteenth Amendment protections prohibit a state from depriving any
person of life, liberty, or property without due process of law. 52 Before property
may be taken away by the government, the Due Process Clause requires that the
individual be given an opportunity to protect their property interests.s3 For
purposes of court proceedings, the clause has been interpreted to require that a
party be given the opportunity to have its day in court before a neutral tribunal. 54
Early on, the Court ignored the use of the word "persons," declaring, without
justification, that the word included corporations.5 5
The ability of corporate due process rights to enjoin state action has evolved.
over time; however, states have maintained the authority to treat foreign
corporations differently.56 Historically, foreign corporations were treated as
artificial entities outside of the state in which they were incorporated, invisible to
49 See Lyman Johnson & David Millon, Corporate Law After Hobby Lobby, 70 Bus. LAW 1, 8
(2014) ("[C]orporations own property, enter into contracts, and commit torts. They can sue and be sued
in their own right. They are subject to penalties if they violate applicable criminal laws. They must
comply with a vast array of federal and state regulations . . . . [T]hey are subject to income tax liability
on the net income generated by their commercial activities . . . . [The rights and obligations of
corporations are not simply those of their shareholders, officers, directors, employees, or other humans
who participate in or are affected by the corporation's activities").
50 This approach, known as the aggregate theory, envisions corporations as being made up of
individuals vested with constitutional rights, whose rights do not disappear when they unite in a
corporate form. See County of San Mateo v. S. Pac. R.R. Co., 13 F. 722, 744 (1882) ("It would be a
most singular result if a constitutional provision intended for the protection of every person against
partial and discriminating legislation by the states, should cease to exert such protection the moment the
person becomes a member of a corporation. We cannot accept such a conclusion."); see also Reuven S.
Avi-Yonah, Citizens United and the Corporate Form, 2010 WIS. L. REv. 999, 1012-13 (2010)
(citations omitted) (stating individuals do not lose their right to equal protection because of the
association).
s SeeAvi-Yonah, supra note 50, at 1013.
52
SeeU.S. CONST. amend. XIV § 1.
5 SeeJones v. Flowers, 547 U.S. 220, 232 (2006); Mullane v. Cent. Hanover Bank &Tr. Co., 339
U.S. 306, 314 (1950); Washington exrel. Bond & Goodwin & Tucker v. Superior Court ofWash., 289
U.S. 361, 365 (1933).
54 See Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 348-49 (1976) (citing Joint Anti-Fascist Refugee
Comm. v. McGrath, 341 U.S. 123, 168 (1951)); Mulane, 339 U.S. at 314.
ss See Santa Clara v. S. Pac. R.R. Co., 118 U.S. 394, 394 (1886); see also Susanna Kim Ripken,
Citizens United, Corporate Personhood & Corporate Powr: The Tension Between Constitutional
Law and CorporateLaw, 6 U. ST. THOMAS J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 285, 288 (2012) ("[O]ver the last 125
years, the Supreme Court has held corporations are persons entitled to numerous constitutional
protections, even though the word 'corporation' does not appear anywhere in the Constitution.");
Ciepley, supra note 46, at 222 (asserting that the drafters of the Fourteenth Amendment did not intend
to include corporations as persons granted due process and equal protection rights).
s6 Bank of Augusta v. Earle, 38 U.S. 519, 519 (1839).
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other jurisdictions until admitted to do business within such jurisdictions' borders.s7
As a result of this view of corporations as creatures created and managed by the
state, federal courts historically have been leery of interfering with what was
defined under state law. 8 Even today, following recent advancements in corporate
rights, courts have done little to prohibit additional state regulation of foreign
corporations.5 ' This Part explores the history of corporate due process, analyzes the
impact of state laws on corporate due process prior to Citizens United, and briefly
discusses the development of state corporate statutes.
A. A History of CorporateDue ProcessRights
As with all of the amendments to the Constitution, the text of the Fourteenth
Amendment is focused on persons, not corporations.60 The Fourteenth
Amendment requires that "[n]o state shall make or enforce any law" that
"deprive[s] any person of life, liberty or property without due process of law."6 ' The
Amendment protects "life" and "liberty"-rights that only a natural person can
enjoy.6 Initially, it was the protection of the third item, property, which enabled
expansion of due process rights to corporations.' For purposes of court
proceedings, due process has been interpreted to mean the right to be heard at a
meaningful time, in a meaningful way, before suffering a loss of any kind."
Due process was one of the earliest corporate constitutional rights
acknowledged by the courts. And Due Process has been discussed most often with

See Bank of Augusta v. Earle, 38 U.S. 519, 524, 559 (1839); see also Note, supra note 12, at 739.
" See Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, 134 S. Ct. 2751, 2756 (2014) (discussing that "[c]ourts will
turn to that structure and the underlying state law in resolving disputes."); see alo discussion infra
Section I.C.
* See Stefan J. Padfield, FindingState Action When CorporationsGovern, 82 TEMP. L. REV.
703, 722 (2009) (explicating that corporations are "creatures of the State").
6 See U.S. CONST. amend. XIV § 1.
17

61

Id.

See Ins. Co. v. New Orleans, 13 F. Cas. 67, 68 (C.C.D. La. 1870) (No. 7,052) ("Only natural
persons can be born or naturalized; only natural persons can be deprived of life or liberty, so that it is
dear that artificial persons are excluded from the provisions of the first two clauses .... ).
63 See Herbert Hovenkamp, The ClassicalCorporationin American Legal Thought, 76 GEO. L.J.
1593, 1649 (1988) ("[T]he corporate personhood doctrine of Santa Clara represented-an efficient way
for the corporation to assert the property rights of its shareholders.").
64 See Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 333 (1976) (citations omitted) ('This Court consistently
has held that some form of hearing is required before an individual is finally deprived of a property
interest."); Mullane v. Cent. Hanover Bank & Tr. Co., 339 U.S. 306, 314 (1950) (citations omitted)
("An elementary and fundamental requirement of due process in any proceeding which is to be accorded
finality is notice reasonably calculated, under all the circumstances, to apprise interested parties of the
pendency of the action and afford them an opportunity to present their objections."). Corporations have
also been held to have liberty rights under the Fifth Amendment. See Old Dominion Dairy Prods., Inc.
v. Sec. of Def., 631 F.2d 953, 962 (D.C. Cir. 1980).
62
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regard to the rights of corporations, not natural persons.6 s In an often-quoted
passage on corporate rights found in Santa Clara County v. Southern Pacific
RailroadCompany, the Court proclaims that it "does not wish to hear argument on
the question whether the . . . Fourteenth Amendment . . . applies to these

corporations. We are all of [the] opinion that it does."66 In Santa Clara, the Court
held that a corporation's property could not be taxed differently from that of a
natural person.6' Thus, the property was the source of the corporation's
constitutional rights.6 1 In San Mateo v. S. Pac. R.R. Co., a railroad case that
preceded Santa Clara, a Federal District Court in California held, "whenever a
provision of the constitution, or of a law, guaranties to persons the enjoyment of
property, or affords to them means for its protection, or prohibits legislation
injuriously affecting it, the benefits of the provision extend to corporations . . . ."
In Santa Clara and San Mateo, the corporations were granted property rights
during chartering: a state may not impose unconstitutional limits on rights which it
has granted.o
Following Santa Clara, the Court continued the expansion of Fourteenth
Amendment rights. For example, in Southern Railway Company v. Greene, the
Court concluded that the corporation is a person under the Fourteenth
Amendment due to the property rights granted when it was chartered by the
state. 7 ' This trend persists through a series of additional railroad cases.72
Particularly in Covington & Lexington Tpk. Rd. Co. v. Sanford, the Court
declared: "It is now settled that corporations are persons, within the meaning of the
constitutional provisions forbidding the deprivation of property without due
6s See, e.g., First Nat'l Bank of Bos. v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 780 n.15
(1978); Bell v. Maryland,
378 U.S. 226,262 (1964); Conn. Gen. Life Ins. Co. v. Johnson, 303 U.S. 77, 80-81 (1938); Grosjean v.
Am. Press Co., 297 U.S. 233, 244 (1936); Pierce v. Soc'y of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510, 533-34 (1925);
Minneapolis & St. Louis Ry. Co. v. Beckwith, 129 U.S. 26, 28 (1889); Santa Clara v. S. Pac. R.R. Co.,
118 U.S. 394, 409 (1886). As justice Hugo Black observed, in the first fifty years after Santa Clara, of
cases analyzing the Fourteenth Amendment "less than one-half of one per cent. invoked it in protection
of the negro race, and more than fifty per cent. asked that its benefits be extended to corporations."
Conn. Gen. Life Ins. Co., 303 U.S. at 90.
66 Santa Clara, 118 U.S. at 398; see also Minneapolis & St. Louis Ry. Co., 129 U.S. at 28
(extending Fourteenth Amendment procedural due process to corporations).
67 Santa Clara, 118 U.S. at 416.

'9 County of San Mateo v. S. Pac. R.R. Co., 13 F. 722, 744 (C.C.D. Cal. 1882).
70 See Morton J. Horowitz, Santa Clara Revisited: The Development of Corporate Theory, 88 W.
VA. L. REv. 173, 186 (1985) (opining that, generally, when courts invoke the concession theory, they
are only concerned with protecting the rights granted by the state, not with expansion of rights); see also
Jonathan A. Marcantel, The Corporationas a "Real"ConstitutionalPerson, 11. U.C. DAVIS BUs. L.J.
221, 225 (2011) ("[C]orporations are subordinate to the government, as the government can create and
regulate them."); David Millon, Theories ofthe Corporation, 1990 DUKE. L.J. 201, 212 (1990).
7 S. Ry. Co. v. Greene, 216 U.S. 400, 412-13 (1910).
See Covington & Lexington Tpk. Rd. Co. v. Sanford, 164 U.S. 578, 592 (1896); Gulf of Colo.
& Santa Fe Ry. Co. v. Ellis, 165 U.S. 150, 154 (1897).
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process of law, as well as a denial of equal protection of the laws."73 The courts have
operated as if corporations were included in the intended beneficiaries of the
Fourteenth Amendment because of their property rights.
The right of corporations to the Fourteenth Amendment's procedural due
process mandates has been consistently reaffirmed over the last century.74 Often in
dissents or dicta, however, judges have commented on the lack of analysis and
support for these corporate due process rights. For example, in a 1949 decision,
Justice Douglas. remarked that as a result of the Court's repeated selective
application of the personhood designation from clause to clause of the
Constitution, the Court had revised the meaning of the Fourteenth Amendment. 7s
In Lassiter v. Department of Social Services, Justice Stewart expressed a similar
sentiment, stating that the Due Process Clause results in judicial activism because it
"can never be precisely defined. '[Unlike some legal rules' . . . due process 'is not a

technical conception with a fixed content unrelated to time, place and
circumstances.'"' The flexibility of due process, combined with this lack of clearly
defined rules, precedent in Fourteenth Amendment cases, and the holdings of
Citizens United and HobbyLobby, makes it easy to envision a successful challenge
to the MBCA withdrawal statute. The Court's adoption of a stronger view of the
corporation and its rights in those cases renders the current approach to corporate
due process unconstitutional.
B. State Limitationson CorporateDue Process
The Court has defined due process protections to require states to guarantee
that all "persons"-both natural and corporate-shall not be deprived of property
without due process of law. The case law dearly establishes that due process
I

Covington & Lexington Tpk. Rd. Co., 164 U.S. at 592.
See, e.g., Brandon L. Garrett, The ConstitutionalStanding of Corporations,163 U. PA. L. REV.
95, 113-14 (2014) (providing a survey of corporate due process rights).
's Wheeling Steel Corp. v. Glander, 337 U.S. 562, 579 (1949) (asserting that this selective
application of personhood designation within the context of the Fourteenth Amendment "requires
distortion to read 'person' as meaning one thing, then another within the same clause and from clause to
clause. It means, in my opinion, a substantial revision of the Fourteenth Amendment."); see also
Ripken, supra note 55, at 300.
76 Lassiter v. Dep't of Soc. Servs., 452 U.S. 18, 24 (1981) (quoting Cafeteria Workers v. McElroy,
367 U.S. 886, 895 (1961)).
7
.
This is particularly true for the fact-intensive holding in Hobby Lobby Many view the opinion as
a narrowly tailored holding that applies only to the unique condition of the closely held corporation with
a religious purpose. See discussion infra Section II.B. Courts issue similar due process opinions
perceived to apply narrowly to the factual scenario contemplated by the court, but which results in
reforms to due process generally. See, e.g., Jones v. Flowers, 547 U.S. 220, 232 (2006); see also Mathews
v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 334 (1976); Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 481 (1972).
' See, e.g., First Nat'l Bank of Bos. v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 824 (1978) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting)
("[W]hen a State creates a corporation with the power to acquire and utilize property, it necessarily and
implicitly guarantees that the corporation will not be deprived of that property absent due process of
law.").
7
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protects the property rights of corporations, either as an artificial entity or as an
extension of the rights of the shareholders." If a corporation is given property
rights, it then has the right to a day in court to protect those rights.' Due process
requires the state to develop regulations to ensure that corporations receive notice
of suit reasonably calculated so that they are allowed an opportunity to present
objections." Through due process, corporations are entitled to "the same protection
of equal laws that natural persons . . . have a right to demand under like

circumstances." 2 A defendant must be given an opportunity to either appear in
court or default. 3 Any method for service must be reasonably calculated under afl
circumstances to provide notice of suit.' Despite these clear and undisputable
proclamations by the courts, foreign corporations have long been denied full
protection of due process because, prior to Citizens United, courts found
withdrawal statutes to meet these requirements. 5
Historically, courts have made a distinction between foreign and domestic
corporations, treating domestic corporations similar to natural persons and foreign
corporations like foreign nations. 6 Foreign corporations were treated as artificial
entities outside of the state in which they were incorporated, invisible to other
jurisdictions until admitted to do business within them." Such treatment seems
particularly outdated in the modern context of multi-state and multi-national
corporations." In addition, these distinctions may be viewed as arbitrary following
Citizens Unitedand HobbyLobby, as both cases advocate for states to examine the

" See, e.g., Nw. Nat'1 Life Ins. Co. v. Riggs, 203 U.S. 243, 255 (1906). Scholars also view Santa
Clara as a representation of the aggregate theory of the firm. Under the aggregate theory, the
corporation's rights are derived from the rights of the individuals who form the corporation. Those
rights do not disappear when the individuals unite in the corporate form. For an analysis of how the
aggregate theory applies to the Santa Claradecision, see Hovenkamp, supra note 63, at 1649 ("[T]he
corporate personhood doctrine of Santa Clara represented an efficient way for the corporation to assert
the property rights of its shareholders.").
0 See Mathes, 424 U.S. at 333; see also Marshall v. Jerrico, Inc., 446 U.S. 238, 242 (1980)
("[T]wo central concerns of procedural due process [are] the prevention of unjustified or mistaken
depravations [of property] and the promotion of participation and dialogue by affected individuals in the
decision making process.").
s1 See Mullane v. Cent. Bank & Tr. Co., 339 U.S. 306, 314 (1950); see also b7owers, 547 U.S. at
232.
8 Quaker City Cab Co. v. Pennsylvania, 277 U.S. 389, 400 (1928).
' SeeMullane, 339 U.S. at 314.
8 See id.
8 Seediscussion infra Section III.A.
6 SeeBank of Augusta v. Earle, 38 U.S. 519, 524, 559 (1839); see also Note, supra note 12, at 739.
* See Earle, 38 U.S. at 588; see also Note, supra 12, at 739.
s Even in the 1950s when the Model Business Corporation Act was being developed, scholars
questioned the continuation of the fiction of the foreign corporation. See, e.g., Note, supra note 12, at
757-58.
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nature of the right-not the party exercising the right-when determining if a
restriction violates the Constitution.8
States are permitted to police the right to do business within their borders
through regulations and restrictions imposed only on foreign corporations."o As
time passed and corporations became more prevalent, states took steps to develop
more stringent regulatory schemes, exposing a clear intent to distinguish between
corporations and natural persons." States were motivated by a desire to protect
corporations and other businesses founded within the their borders, and the desire
to protect their citizens from corporations that may utilize their non-corporeal
form to evade liability.92 Thus, states regulate foreign corporate entry into their
borders, restricting corporate activity and imposing requirements for service and
other activities.93 States have a legitimate interest in holding foreign corporations
liable for actions arising from activity within their borders. 94
Early on, in Bank ofAugusta v. Earle, the Supreme Court analogized foreign
corporations to foreign states holding, "Every principle of law which allows foreign
states to sue in the Courts of other countries, applies to corporations."' Under the
logic first articulated in Earle, state regulation of foreign corporations generally
does not violate due process.9' States may exclude a foreign corporation from
carrying on intrastate activities when a foreign corporation has not fulfilled the
state's qualification requirements. 97 Equal protection does not prevent the
exclusion of foreign corporations altogether or the imposition of conditions for

9 Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310, 339-42 (2010); Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, 134 S.
Ct. 2751, 2768-69 (2014); see discussion infra Part II.
9 See, e.g., Earle, 38 U.S. at 589.
See Mayer, supra note 46, at 585-88. Professor Mayer summarizes the history of state and federal
corporate regulation through the progressive era. Mayer notes that while states developed regulations,
corporations still preferred state regulation to federal control. See id. at 585 (citations omitted).
9 Although procedural due process does not involve a balancing test, some scholars have argued
that flowers advances the idea that such balancing indicative of substantive due process is now
appropriate for procedural due process as well. Patrick J. Borchers, Essay, Jones v. 1owers: An Essay on
a Uni6ed Theory of ProceduralDue Process, 40 CREIGHTON L. REV. 343, 351-52 (2007). When
considering whether a restriction is appropriate under substantive due process analysis, courts consider
"the private interest that will be affected by the official action; . . . the risk of an erroneous deprivation of
such interest through the procedures used, and the probable value . . . of additional or substitute
procedural safeguards; ... and finally, the government's interest." Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319,
334-35 (1976).
9 See Earle, 38 U.S. at 527-28.
* See St. Mary's Franco-Am. Petroleum Co. v. West Virginia, 203 U.S. 183, 191 (1906).
" Earle, 38 U.S. at 525.
96 Id.
9 See St. Mary's Franco-Am. Petroleum Co., 203 U.S. at 191 ("It is argued that the act of February
22, 1905, is invalid under the 14th Amendment, in that it deprives the company of liberty of contract
and property without due process of law, and denies it the equal protection of the laws. But, in view of
repeated decisions of this court, the contention is without merit. The state had the dear right to regulate
its own creations, and a fortiori, foreign corporations permitted to transact business within its borders.").
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entry." This relies on a fiction to impose conditions on foreign corporations that
would not be acceptable if imposed on natural, out-of-state persons. A state may
not prevent natural persons from crossing its borders, nor may it condition entry
into the state on terms that are more favorable to domestic persons." For a
corporation, restrictions on the opportunity to do business within a state are the
equivalent of a natural person being denied the opportunity to cross state lines. As a
result, under Citizens United, this fiction operates to create an unconstitutional
distinction between natural persons and corporations.
Prior to Citizens United, courts allowed restrictions of the Fourteenth
Amendment's procedural due process requirements as applied to foreign
corporations.o A foreign corporation could not object to a statute based simply on
the premise that it would be unconstitutional as applied to those in another or
dissimilar situation, such as a natural person or domestic corporation.101 This is
because states operated under the fiction that a foreign corporation was not a
"person" within the meaning of constitutional protections until it was granted
permission to do business within a state's borders. 1 02 Before it is granted admission,
a corporation is "a mere artificial being" of the state where it is created, but in
another state, where "that law ceases to operate, and is no longer obligatory, the
corporation can have no existence."' 0 ' Yet, states are prohibited from pretending
that natural persons are not entitled to full legal protections until they are formally
admitted. Instead, merely being present within a state grants natural persons legal
privileges and subjects them to that state's laws and limitations, a privilege not
extended to foreign corporations.

" See W. & S. Life Ins. Co. v. State Bd. of Equalization of Ca., 451 U.S. 648, 656-58 (1981);
Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Jenkins, 297 U.S. 629, 631-32 (1936); Washington errel. Bond & Goodwin
&Tucker v. Superior Court of Wash., 289 U.S. 361, 364 (1933).
9 See U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 2, cl. 1.
10 Washington exrel. Bond & Goodwin & Tucker v. Superior Court of Wash., 289 U.S. 361,
365-66 (1933)
0 See Bourjois, Inc. v. Chapman, 301 U.S. 183, 190 (1937); Premier-Pabst Sales Co. v. Grosscup,
298 U.S. 26, 227 (1936); Washington er rel. Bond, 289 U.S. at 366; Ry. Express Agency, Inc. v.
Virginia, 282 U.S. 440, 444 (1931).
102 See Earle, 38 U.S. at 519-20; see also Am. Ry. Express Co. v. Royster Guano Co., 273 U.S.
274, 280 (1927); Mut. Reserve Fund Life Ass'n v. Phelps, 190 U.S. 148 (1903); St. Clair v. Cox, 106
U.S. 350, 352 (1882); Lafayette Ins. Co. v. French, 59 U.S. 404, 407 (1855).
1as Earle, 38 U.S. at 520. This treatment of foreign corporations creates a negative incentive to
properly register to do business in a jurisdiction. Foreign corporations cannot escape jurisdiction by
failing to register. Foreign corporations can, however, avoid historically inequitable treatment and any
obligations imposed by the state. The purpose of registration is to ensure foreign corporations may be
held responsible for any legal action that may arise due to their conduct; the purpose is not to generate
default judgments in favor of state residents. However, to the extent that the corporate statutes act to
disadvantage foreign corporations and deprive them of procedural due process rights, they have the
effect of making corporations fail to register and make it more difficult for residents to recover damages.
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Once a corporation is admitted to do business within a state, it is entitled to
due process.' 04 However, courts have repeatedly held that the ability to conduct
business within a state is adequate consideration for a corporation to agree to limit
its procedural due process rights by agreeing to be deemed served through statutory
service of process on an agent.'os If a corporation fails to receive notice of service
due to its failure to comply with statutory requirements for maintaining an agent,
or providing an address, the state does not violate due process if it moves forward as
if the corporation received actual notice.'o6 The state is merely required to ensure
that constructive notice by substitute service on the Secretary of State is executed,
and that such service is reasonably calculated to provide notice and an opportunity
to be heard to the foreign corporation in all circumstances.1 0 7 But when a foreign
corporation fails to update its address, the withdrawal statutes substitute service is
not reasonably calculated to provide notice and an opportunity to be heard.'
Withdrawal statutes draw a distinction between individuals, foreign
corporations, and domestic corporations.10 ' States knowingly impose conditions on
corporations that may result in a failure to receive actual notice and which do not
equate to the constructive notice standards imposed on individuals. 1 o Because the
foreign corporation is non-existent before being admitted to the State, courts
before Citizens United did not find this outcome to violate due process.' Citizens
United and Hobby Lobby, however, may signal a change in how states can
constitutionally regulate a foreign corporation." 2 If corporations are now embodied
with rights equal to those of natural persons at their inception, deeming foreign
corporations non-existent until they are admitted to a state will not stand under
either case.

See Hunter v. Mut. Reserve Life Ins. Co., 218 U.S. 573, 580 (1910).
Washington ex rel. Bond, 289 U.S. at 363; Bagdon v. Philadelphia & Reading Coal &Iron Co.,
111 N.E. 1075, 1076 (N.Y. 1916).
10 Washington ex rel. Bond, 289 U.S. at 364.
1" See Milliken v. Meyer, 311 U.S. 457, 463 (1940); Blackmer v. United States, 284 U.S. 421, 440
(1932); Clemens v. District Court, 390 P.2d 83, 86 (Colo. 1964); Sgitcovich v. Sgitcovich, 241 S.W.2d
142, 146 (Tex. 1951).
155 See discussion infra Section III.A.
See, e.g., MODEL Bus. CORP. ACT. § 15.20 (2010) (outlining requirements for foreign
corporations following withdrawal from a jurisdiction, and requiring foreign corporations to perpetually
provide the secretary of state with an address for service following withdrawal); see discussion infra
Section III.C.
110 See, e.g., Jones v. Flowers, 547 U.S. 220, 232 (2006) (When analyzing a failure of service of
process on a natural person, courts require that the constructive notice be reasonably calculated to result
in notice in all circumstances, and require the party to take reasonable measures after such notice fails.);
see discussion infra Section III.A.
n.. See, e.g., Bank of Augusta v. Earle, 38 U.S. 519, 527 (1839) (Once a foreign corporation seeks
permission to do business in a state, that state may, consistent with due process, provide.a mechanism
for its residents to serve the corporation within the State even after the corporation has ceased doing
business there.); see supra notes 95-98 and accompanying text.
112 See supra note 18 and accompanying
text.
10
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C. The Development of Corporate Statutes
While the Supreme Court has made numerous proclamations with regard to
constitutional rights over the years, it is clear that "the corporation . . . owes its
existence and attributes to state law.""' States have assumed most responsibility for
the regulation of corporations." 4 State laws define corporations, limit their
operational purposes, and impose regulations upon them.' States also define the
legal consequences of corporations' being recognized to do business within their
borders.' 1 6 Since corporations are creatures of the state, federal courts historically
have been leery of interfering with what was defined by the states under state
law."' Today, scholars and courts broadly recognize state law as central to the
regulation of corporations."'
As such, courts have continued to give deference to state corporate statutes in
the face of disparate outcomes. This allows states to police corporations and to
favor domestic corporations over foreign corporations."' Service of process is an
area that illustrates these outcomes. It has long been established that once a foreign
corporation seeks permission to do business in a state, that state may, consistent
with due process, provide a mechanism for its residents to serve the corporation
within the State even after the corporation has ceased doing business there.1 2 0 It is
only when the state-chosen means of service is arbitrary or unreasonable that such
service violates due process. 121 Before Citizens United, many courts found actual
notice was not required and that failure to receive notice of suit, which was the
fault of the corporation's own negligence, did not violate due process.122

113 CTS Corp. v. Dynamics Corp. of Am., 481 U.S. 69, 94 (1987).
14

SeeMayer, supra note 46, at 584 (citations omitted); see also Garrett, supra note 74, at 105.

"' See Garrett, supra note 74, at 105; Reza Dibadj, (Mis)Conceptionsof the Corporation,29 GA.

ST. L. REv. 731, 735-36 (2013).
116 See Garrett, supra note 74, at 105; Mayer, supra note 46, at 584.
117 See Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, 134 S. Ct. 2751, 2756 (2014) (discussing that "[c]ourts will
turn to that structure and the underlying state law in resolving disputes.").
us Id.; Stefan J. Padfield, Finding State Action When CorporationsGovern, 82 TEMP. L. REV.
703, 724 (2009) (arguing corporate theory recognizes that the "State is one of the parties to the
corporate contract with interests beyond merely providing gap-filler rules to effectuate as nearly as
possible the intent of the corporate managers and shareholders.").
119 See, eg., Hobby Lobby, 134 S. Ct. at 2775.
120 Bank of Augusta v. Earle, 38 U.S. 519, 527-28 (1839).
us Sieg v. Int'l Envtl. Mgmt., Inc., 375 S.W.3d 145, 155 (Mo. Ct. App. 2012) (citing Washington
exrel. Bond & Goodwin &Tucker v. Superior Court ofWash., 289 U.S. 361, 364-65 (1933)).
m22 See, e.g., Washington exrel. Bond & Goodwin & Tucker v. Superior Court of Wash., 289 U.S.
361, 365-66 (1933) ("The power of the state altogether to exclude the corporation, and the consequent
ability to condition its entrance into the state, distinguishes this case from those involving substituted
service upon individuals, whose entrance into a state may render them amenable to action there, only if
the statute providing for substituted service incorporates reasonable provision for giving the defendant
notice of the initiation of litigation.") (internal citations omitted).
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How states treat corporations chartered outside of their borders can heavily
impact corporate operations. This is because corporations tend to incorporate in a
jurisdiction that is the least restrictive. As a result, most corporations still choose to
incorporate in Delaware, but they do business all over the country as foreign
corporations." The law of Delaware governs the internal affairs of these
corporation, but the law of the state where an incident occurs governs procedural
rules, including service of process. Therefore, while Delaware may be the most
useful jurisdiction to analyze for determining matters related to corporate
governance, the MBCA is more influential for laws governing the day-to-day
interactions of foreign corporations.' 24 The MBCA has been adopted in whole or
in part by thirty-eight jurisdictions.'2 5 Thus, the withdrawal requirements found in
the MBCA have an impact on most corporations.
Because most states do not have a legacy of comprehensive corporate case law
like that found in Delaware, the text and comments accompanying the MBCA
have heavily influenced how the regulations are enforced and interpreted in the
courts.1 2 6 The MBCA has adopted the position that a state may condition the right
of a foreign corporation to do business within its borders on terms that do not
apply to domestic corporations. 127 Scholars have long expressed concern over the
inequitable treatment of foreign and domestic corporations in this paradigm where
corporations that originate in the United States are treated as foreigners for
purposes of interstate commerce.1 28 Upon admission, each state requires that a
corporation name an agent for service of process or that the corporation appoint the
Secretary of State to receive service of process. 12 9 Each state also has requirements
for a corporation that wishes to "withdraw" or cease doing business within the
state.13 o
The MBCA withdrawal statute requires a foreign corporation that ceases to do
business within a state to file a certificate of withdrawal, revoke the authority of its
registered agent, consent to service on the Secretary of State, and provide an

m See Note, supra note 12 at 737 n.4.
124 See Jeffrey M. Gorris et al., Delaware CorporateLaw and the Model Business CorporationAct:

A Studyin Symbiosis, L. &CONTEMP. PROBS., Winter 2011, at 107, 108.
m See Alan R Palmiter, CORPORATIONS: EXAMPLES AND EXPLANATIONS 9 (6th ed. 2009).
126 See Gorris et al., supra note 124, at 108.
127 CompareMODEL Bus. CORP. ACT § 17.01 CMT. (2010) (providing "Section 17.01 applies the
MBCA to all corporations to which that application is constitutionally permissible."), with MODEL
BUS. CORP. ACT § 15.01(a) (2010) (providing a foreign corporation may not transact business in a state
"until it obtains a certificate of
authority from the secretary of state.").
us See, e.g., Note, supra note 12 at 740-41.
' See, e.g., CAL CORP. CODE § 2117 (West 2016); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 371 (West 2016);
N.Y. BUS. CORP. LAw § 1304 (McKinney 2016); MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT § 15.03 (2010).
1
3 See, e.g., MODEL Bus. CORP. ACT. § 15.20 (2010).
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address for the Secretary of State to forward service."' Such a corporation is then
deemed served when service of process is received by the Secretary of State.' 32
There is no case law specifically interpreting the current withdrawal provisions of
the MBCA. The official comment to the MBCA, however, states, "[t]here is no
time limit on the obligation to advise the Secretary of State of changes of mailing
address.""' In comparison, Delaware law requires a corporation to provide an
address for service at the time of withdrawal, but is silent on how long a
corporation must update the address with the Secretary of State." 4 Eight other
states also take this approach."' Two MBCA states, Oregon and Vermont, appear
to see the issue with the MBCA provision and have imposed a time requirement
for reporting a forwarding address."'
By requiring perpetual updating, the MBCA places the burden of the plaintiffs
errors on the defendant, and the MBCA may reward bad actors with a victory by
default judgment." ' The MBCA does not penalize the plaintiff who ignores
current, readily available corporation information and instead purposely indicates
an erroneous address on file with the Secretary of State.1' This outcome is
premised on the idea that the defendant corporation that fails to comply with the
statutes does so at its own peril. " The statutes also are premised on the view that a

131 See id. The state's compelling reason for requiring perpetual updating for a foreign corporation
no longer doing business in the state stems from the perpetual life of the corporation. As a natural
person, liability is limited by mortality. No such natural end to a corporation's life exists. The ability to
live indefinitely, however, does not justify the burden on the corporate defendant nor the possibility of
the reward given to the bad actor plaintiff When combining advances in technology, federal regulatory
reporting requirements, and the general ease of locating correct and current information on a
corporation in modern times, a new analysis of the withdrawal statutes is warranted. The holding in
Citizens United adds weight to this premise.
132 MODEL Bus. CORP. ACT § 15.20(c) (2010).
13
MODEL Bus. CORP. ACT. §15.20 CMT. (2010).
134 DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 381 (West 2016).
13s See ALASKA STAT. ANN. § 10.06.780 (West 2016); HAW. REV. STAT. ANN. § 414-451 (West
2016); IOWA CODE ANN. § 490.1520 (West 2016); LA. STAT. ANN. § 12:312 (2016); MINN. STAT.
ANN. § 303.16 (West 2016); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 18, § 1135 (West 2016); 15 PA. STAT. AND
CONS. STAT. ANN. § 415 (West 2016); 7 R.I. GEN. LAWS ANN. § 7-12-1412 (West 2016).
136 Oregon and Vermont have adopted a modified version of the MBCA updating requirement,
including a number of years in which the corporation must update its address. See OR. REV. STAT.
ANN. § 60.734 (West 2016) (5 years); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 11A, § 15.20 (West 2016) (7 years).
Although not a MBCA state, Missouri has a similar provision to MBCA § 15.20, but places a five-year
cap on the requirement to update. SeeMO. ANN. STAT. § 351.596 (West 2016).
137 See infra notes 260-267 and accompanying text.
13s See MODEL Bus. CORP. ACT. §15.20 (2010); see also infra notes 240-50 and accompanying
text.
139 See, e.g., Campus Invs., Inc. v. Cullever, 144 S.W.3d 464, 466 (Tex. 2004). ("When substituted
service on a statutory agent is allowed, the designee is not an agent for serving but for receivingprocess
on the defendant's behalf... A certificate ... from the Secretary of State conclusively establishes that
process was served.") (internal citations omitted); see discussion infra Section III.A.
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corporation with perpetual life has a perpetual duty to monitor a jurisdiction.14
These reasons are not in line with the requirements of procedural due process,
particularly under the new paradigm created by Citizens United.14

The MBCA embodies the holdings of pre-Citizens United case law. The
MBCA creates corporations, both foreign and domestic, that are given "the same
powers as an individual to do all things necessary and convenient to carry out its
business and affairs . . . ."142 A foreign corporation, however, also has its rights
restricted by state regulation because, "the right of a foreign corporation to enter a
state to engage in business depends on the consent of the state."143 In addition,
under the MBCA, a corporation has an identity that is separate and distinct from
human beings. The issue presented by Citizens Unitedis whether the MBCA and
other corporate statutes accurately reflect the new level of equality between natural
persons and corporations.
II. CITIZENS UNITED AND THE EVOLUTION OF CORPORATE RIGHTS

In 2011, the Citizens United decision expanded corporate First Amendment
rights, holding that distinctions based on who is asserting a right are improper.'"
Citizens Unitedconsidered whether corporate free speech included political speech,
even though a corporation is not a citizen capable of voting. 145 The Court
disregarded this distinction between corporations, natural persons, and citizens;
instead, the Citizens United majority proclaimed that states must look to the
underlying nature of the right, not to the party exercising the right.'46 Although
Citizens United is viewed as an overreach that transcends previous corporate
jurisprudence, the idea that corporations are persons deserving of rights equal to
those of natural citizens is not new.147
Citizens United is in line with a trend in corporate constitutional law that
began as early as the 1960s, and views corporate personhood, and the rights
accompanying that status, as existing based on the nature of the right itself 148 In
keeping with this paradigm, Citizens United envisions a corporation as equal to a
natural person and extends rights to a corporation by looking to the history of the
"0 SeeMODEL BUS. CORP. ACT. §3.02 (2010); see also discussion infra Section III.A.
141 Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310, 349-56 (2010). This outcome not only contradicts the
requirements of Citizens United, but also H7owers. See discussion infra Section III.B.
142

MODEL Bus. CORP. ACT § 3.02 (2010).

'43 Kaw Boiler Works v. Frymyer, 227 P. 453, 455 (Okla. 1924); see also Hale v. Henkel, 201 U.S.
43, 74 (1906) ("[T]he corporation is a creature of the state .... presumed to be incorporated for the

benefit of the public.").
1" Citizens Unitel, 558 U.S. at 338-41.
145 Id. at 342-55.
46
1
d
147

See, e.g., First Nat'l Bank of Bos. v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 780 n.15 (1978).

148 Id. at 777-78 (holding that the proper question is whether the activity that falls within are what
the Constitution meant to protect).
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amendment, or to the underlying purpose of the amendment, to justify the
extension of corporate rights.149 Thus, when viewing the decision in light of
precedent, Citizens United is no surprise; it is merely the end of more than fifty
years of expanding corporate rights.so
This is particularly true for rights already given vast leeway, like Fourteenth
Amendment due process rights."' The Hobby Lobby decision is an example of
this. Hobby Lobby expands the religious rights of corporations, holding that if a
corporation has a religious purpose, it also has religious rights derived from the
natural persons who unite through the corporate form.' 52 If Hobby Lobby is any
indication of the direction of future court decisions, it shows that future challenges
will encompass an analysis of the nature of the right that will focus on the degree of
equality based on either the rights of the people who comprise the corporation or
on the rights of the corporation as a real entity."5 3 This Part of the Article will
contextualize the Citizens United decision within the greater corporate personhood
debate. It will also explore how the Hobby Lobby decision is the first of many
constitutional challenges to come. This Part concludes that Citizens United
requires states to review restrictions on rights by looking to the nature of the right
itself and not to the fact that the actor is a corporation.

149 See Mayer, supra note 46, at 629 ("Frequently the Court looked to the history of the amendment
in question to justify corporate rights ... [and] occasionally .. .examined the underlying purpose of the
amendment . . . ."). In Citizens United, the majority does not adhere to any one theory of the firm in
reaching its conclusion. See Citizens Unired, 558 U.S. at 364. As Professor Mayer explains in his work
on the history of corporate personhood, before 1960 the Court only viewed corporations as an artificial
entity or a natural entity, yet after 1960 the Court abandoned applying any theory of the firm. Mayer,
supra note 46, at 620. ("Before 1960, the Court only considered corporations' constitutional guarantees
within the strictures of corporate personhood theory: a corporation was either an 'artificial' entity subject
to expansive state regulation or a 'natural' entity entitled to constitutional protections against the state.
After 1960, the Court abandoned theorizing about corporate personhood."); see alsoJess M. Krannich,
The Corporate "Person"'A New Analetical Approach to a Fawed Method of Constitutional
Interpretation, 37 Loy. U. CHI. LJ. 61, 62 (2005) ("[T]he Court has never established a test to
determine what a constitutional person is or whether a corporation meets such a test ... . The result is a
foundational problem in corporate constitutional law, for the Court has granted corporations
constitutional rights without engaging in the preliminary inquiry of whether a corporation is entitled to
them under the Constitution.").
ISO See Mayer, supra note 46, at 588-89.
151 See supra notes 75-78 and accompanying text.
152 Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2751, 2759 (2014).
153 See President, Dirs. and Co. of the Bank of the U.S. v. Dandridge et al., 25 U.S. (12 Wheat.)
64, 91-92 (1827) (Marshall, J., dissenting); see also, e.g., Marcantel, supra note 70, at 222 n.7.
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The Landscape of CorporateRights Follofwing Citizens United

The holding of Citizens United may be a point on a slippery slope that starts
with Belotti154 and continues to slide further past Citizens United to Hobby
Lobby. In Bellotti, the Court asserted that "[t]he proper question therefore is not
whether corporations 'have' First Amendment rights and, if so, whether they are
coextensive with natural persons.

. .

. [Rather, the] question in this case .

.

. is

whether the corporate identity of the speaker deprives this proposed speech of what
otherwise would be its clear entitlement to protection." 55 This reinforces the idea
that courts must look to the nature of the right and not the party exercising the
right. The current endpoint, Hobby Lobby, proves that Citizens United has
opened the door for corporations to launch constitutional challenges to restrictions
the Court held to be constitutional in the past.' 6 Constructive notice, as the
MBCA withdrawal statutes define it, is one such challengeable restriction. 57
In Citizens United, the majority struck down campaign finance regulation on
the premise that corporations should receive the same First Amendment
protections as natural persons, holding that distinctions based on who is asserting a
right are improper.5 s In support of this holding, the Court cited First Amendment
cases and proclaimed that it "rejected the argument that political speech of
corporations or other associations should be treated differently under the First
Amendment simply because such associations are not 'natural persons.'"159 The
Court held that Congress has "no basis . . . [to] impose restrictions on certain

disfavored speakers." 60 The majority also held that there is no support for the view
that the Amendment's original meaning would permit suppressing a media
corporation's political speech.' 6 ' As Professor Joan MacLeod Heminway explains,
"[u]nder the Court's opinion in Citizens United, corporations are to be treated
identically to individuals; absolute corporate personhood is a fait accompl, at least
for political-speech challenges under the First Amendment."162 Because
" See First Nat'l Bank of Bos. v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 776 (1978). Professor Ciepley compares
the status of a corporation to that of a foreign nation: "[A] foreign government can, within United
States jurisdiction, be a contracting individual, but only in a few legal areas can it claim the protections
of a constitutional individual." Ciepley, supra note 46, at 223.
1ss Bellotti, 435 U.S. at 776, 778. Bellotti also holds that the worth of speech does not depend on
the source. Id.
'56 See discussion supra Section I.B.
1s7 See discussion infra Section 1I.B.

Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310, 364 (2010).
" Id. at 343.
16o Id. at 340.
1ss
9

161 Id. at 365; see also Joan MacLeod Heminway, Thoughts on the Corporation as a Person for

Ruposes of Corporate CriminalLiabilty, 41 STETSON L. REV. 137, 138 (2011) ("In Citizens United,
the Court determined that political-speech protections under the First Amendment apply to
corporations as well as individuals, and it found no basis to allow the government to impose politicalspeech limits 'on certain disfavored speakers."') (quoting Citizens United, 558 U.S. at 312).
162 See Heminway, supra note 161, at 138 (citing Citizens United, 558 U.S. at 342).
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corporations are equal to natural persons, the restrictions on political speech are
unconstitutional.16 3
Citizens United expands on Bellotti, which already gave corporations free

speech rights close to those of natural persons.1 64 In Beflotti, the Court
acknowledged the existence of corporate constitutional rights, including due
process rights. 6 s Belotti, however, also implicitly held that to spend money on a
federal election, one must be not just a person, but also a citizen capable of
voting.166 Before Citizens United, Bellotti was the limit on corporate campaign
activity and a test for corporate constitutional rights.' 6' Bellotti allowed distinctions
based on the abilities of the corporate person derived from its nature as a noncorporeal non-citizen.
Citizens United rejects this. Citizens United expands corporate rights, holding
that the distinctions between persons and citizens are not proper; instead,
corporations should not be restricted any more than a wealthy individual.'s While
a corporation is not an actual citizen and cannot vote, the majority ignored this lack
69
of a physical body, holding that the corporate voice is vital to political discourse.1
Because the corporation is capable of speech protected by the Constitution, the
First Amendment right of a corporation must not be limited simply because the
words are not spoken by a citizen or a natural person.'
Citizens Unitedcan be read to apply this standard of review to all constitutional
rights.1 7 ' Just as a corporation can speak and be deserving of the protections of the
First Amendment, a corporation is capable of suing and being sued, placing them
with the protections of the Fourteenth Amendment.1 72 In fact, under the MBCA, a
corporation is required to consent to being sued in a jurisdiction when it is granted
a charter or the right to do business within a state as a foreign corporation.' 7
Because a corporation is a participant in the court system, it must be given rights
equal to other parties.1 74 Therefore, following Citizens United, state efforts to
mandate a corporation to consent to constructive notice, which does not have a
likelihood of alerting the corporation of pending suits against it, is not

163

See supts notes 158-164 and accompanying text.

164 See Citizens United, 558 U.S. at 349-57.
161 First Nat'l Bank of Bos. v. Bellotti, 435 U.S.

765, 777-83 (1978).
"nId. at 788 n.26, 790; id. 811-12 (White, J., dissenting) (discussing the Federal Corrupt Practices

Act).
See id., 435 U.S. at 788 n.26, 790; id. 811-12 (White, J., dissenting).
Citizens United, 558 U.S. at 350-51.
169 Id. at 349.
170 Id. at 343.
171 See, e.g., Ciepley, supra note 46 at 222-23; Heminway, supra note 161 at 138; Michalski, supra
note 22 at 127.
172 See discussion infra Section III.B.
17 MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT. §15.07 (2010); see also discussion infra Sections I.B.
'74 See infra notes 290-90 and accompanying text.
167
16s
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constitutional. States may only apply a constructive notice statute to foreign
corporations if they mandate the same requirements and constitutional protections
as those guaranteed to natural persons and domestic corporations.
B. The Impact ofHobby Lobby
Hobby Lobby is the natural extension of Citizens United. The case gives an
indication of the direction the Roberts Court may choose when faced with
corporate personhood decisions. In Hobby Lobby, the Supreme Court held that
even for-profit, non-religious corporations may have religion as a purpose. 7 s If a
corporation has such a purpose, the corporation also has religious rights under the
First Amendment."' A determination of the degree to which a state may infringe
upon these rights requires a level of scrutiny equal to that given an individual's
religious rights.1 7 7 For these reasons, a closely-held, for-profit corporation may be
exempt from a law to which its owners religiously object. 178 The majority views the
corporation as a reflection and extension of the beliefs held by an aggregate of the
owners.17' While HobbyLobby applies only in a factually limited circumstance, the
holding is still indicative of the Court's attitude towards corporate constitutional
rights.
Some scholars believe it is possible that since the Religious Freedom
Restoration Act (hereinafter, "RFRA") expands rights beyond typical First
Amendment rights, Hobby Lobby could be seen as- an outlier opinion.so The
RFRA was written in direct response to the Supreme Court's ruling in
Employment Division, Departmentof Human Resources of Oregon v. Smith,' 1
which redefined the limits the federal government may impose on the exercise of
religion.182 Overruling Sherbert v. Veme;'" in Smith, the Court held that "under
175 Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2751, 2771 (2014). The dissent of Hobby
Lobbymakes a point to note that Hobby Lobby is a for-profit corporation, yet such a distinction is not
used to describe business organizations under any corporate statutes at hand in the case or in the
Delaware Law or the MBCA. Professors Johnson and Millon note this distinction and instead refer to
Hobby Lobby as a business corporation. Johnson & Millon, supra note 149 at 1. Johnson and Mion
also believe that the distinction the court draws between for-profit, not-for-profit, and closely held
corporations versus general corporations are of no consequence to the impact of the Hobby Lobby
opinion. Id. at 21. They believe elements of HobbyLobbymay be applied to all corporations. Id at 24.
176 HobbyLobby, 134 S. Ct. at 2771-72.
17 See id. at 2768-69.
171

See id. at 2774-75.

See id. at 2768; see also infra notes 187-191 and accompanying text.
's See, e.g., Steven J. Willis, Corporations, Taxes, andRegion: The Hobby Lobby and Conestoga
Contraceptive Cases, 65 S.C. L. REv. 1, 32 (2013) ("Thus, what might not be protected under
traditional constitutional theory may receive statutory protection under such a high standard of review.
The statute broadly applies to 'government,' as opposed to Congress-as the First Amendment does
facially-and imposes the high standard for all cases, regardless of which standard courts have
adopted.") (internal footnotes omitted).
s SeeJohnson & Millon, supra note 49, at 3.
18 SeegenerallyEmp'tDiv., Dep't of Human Res. of Oregon v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872 (1990).
'7
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the First Amendment, 'neutral, generally applicable laws may be applied to
religious practices even when not supported by a compelling government
interest.'"'" The RFRA reestablished the standard of Sherbert, stating that the
United States Government "shall not substantially burden a person's exercise of
religion even if the burden results from a rule of general applicability . . . ."18 In
Hobby Lobby, the Court concluded that a corporation is within the definition of
"persons" contemplated by the RFRA, bringing corporations within that law's
protection. This conclusion was reached by analyzing the nature of a corporation.'
Hobby Lobby adopts the aggregate theory of the firm, which defines a
corporation as being made up of individuals vested with constitutional rights that
do not disappear when the individuals unite in a corporate form.'"' When reaching
its conclusion, Hobby Lobby found that a corporation is "simply a form of
organization used by human beings to achieve desired ends."' 8 The Court
emphasized that corporate constitutional rights protect the rights possessed and
maintained by the owners, shareholders, and employees as they fulfill their duties in
the corporate capacity. 189 This individual freedom of religion includes freedom to
exercise religion anywhere and in any capacity as protected by the First

374 U.S. 398 (1963).
154 SeeJohnson & Millon, supra note 49, at 3 (quoting City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 514

&

(1997); see also Smith, 494 U.S. at 881-81.
15 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb-1(a) (2012). Under the RFRA, if the government is found to substantially
burden the exercise of religion, the person is entitled to an exemption unless the government can
demonstrate that the application of the burden is "(1) in furtherance of a compelling governmental
interest; and (2) is the least restrictive means of furthering that compelling governmental interest." Id. §
2000bb-1(b). The definition of "exercise of religion" was expanded with the passage of the Religious
Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act of 2000, which states that the RFRA includes "any exercise
of religion, whether or not compelled by, or central to, a system of religious belief." See Johnson
Millon, supra note 49, at 4 (citing 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc-5(7)(A) (2000)). Thus, the RFRA gives persons
more religious rights than those contemplated by the First Amendment. The Court's decision is based
in part on this expansion of the right by the legislation.
'8 See Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2751, 2768 (2014).
15 See id.; see also Avi-Yonah, supra note 50, at 1001. Justice Marshall first proposed the aggregate
theory in Bank of United States v. Deveaux, holding that a corporation cannot be a citizen or sue unless
it can be viewed as a company of individuals, represented by a corporate name. Bank of U.S. v. Deveaux,
9 U.S. (5 Cranch) 61, 86-88, 91 (1809).
s Hobby Lobby, 134 S. Ct. at 2768. The Court appears to ignore that the individuals choose the
corporate form to avail themselves of limited liability, perpetual life, and funding sources not available to
them as individuals, and in exchange agree to comply with restrictions imposed by the incorporation
statutes and federal law.
1" SeeJohnson &Millon, supra note 49, at 16.
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Amendment and the RFRA.9 o As a result, an individual's religion transfers to his
or her businesses by association. 191
Justice Ginsburg, dissenting from Hobby Lobby, proclaimed that the majority
opinion is a departure from historic jurisprudence and a potentially dangerous
expansion of corporate rights. 92 She reasoned that the right to exercise religion is
"characteristic of natural persons, not artificial legal entities. "" Justice Ginsburg
argued religious, non-profit organizations that "exist to foster the interests of
persons subscribing to the same religious faith [should be protected, but not] forprofit corporations."' 94
For Justice Ginsburg and many scholars, HobbyLobby is about more than just
the intersection of First Amendment rights and the RFRA. Although Hobby
Lobby is based in part on a statute that expands the reach of First Amendment
rights, its holding may be influential to the interpretation of corporate
constitutional rights generally.' 95 But as Professor Garrett explains, the Hobby
Lobby Court overreached when it "concluded that protecting free exercise rights of
corporations also protects 'the religious liberty of the humans who own and control
those companies."" 6 Professor Garrett believes "[t]hat reasoning conflates
associational and organizational standing, and it assumes that corporations and
individuals can have common 'beliefs' just as they can have common privacy or
financial interests."9 If the Court stands by this reasoning-continuing to engage
in the conflation articulated by Professor Garnett-it can easily be extended to
other rights. The general concept of common interest worthy of protection could
well be extended to all rights that may be shared by corporations and the natural
persons acting as agents and shareholders. Any state action may face scrutiny based
on how it applies to the aggregation of individuals forming an entity. Professor
Garrett's interpretation is within the spirit of Ginsburg's dissent, yet it is an
approach that the majority feels is an exaggeration."' But we need only analyze the
19

0 See id.

191 See Hobby Lobby, 134 S. Ct. at 2768; see also Johnson & Millon, supra note 49, at 16
("Analytically, in order to preserve the separateness of the corporation as a legal person distinct in a
meaningful way from the humans associated with it, while still acknowledging their desires for religious
expression, the Court emphasized here, and throughout the opinion, the corporate capacity and
corporatepositions and roles played by these humans.").
192 See HobbyLobby, 134 S. Ct. at 2787, 2790-92 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
193 Id. at 2794.
194 Id. at 2795.
9 See Garrett,supra note 74, at 109.
196 Id. at 145 (quoting HobbyLobby, 134 S. Ct.
at 2768).
197 Id.

19s Compare Garrett, supra note 76, at 145 (stating the majority opinion of Hobby Lobby
overreaches and conflates the standing of for-profit organizations), and Hobby Lobby, 135 S. Ct. at
2804-06 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (arguing that the majority opinion will lead to a wave of for-profit
organization accommodation claims), with Hobby Lobby, 135 S. Ct. at 2783-85 (majority opinion)
(reasoning that its ruling is narrow under RFRA and there is no evidence of a possible flood of forprofit organizations seeking exemptions).
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trajectory of corporate rights from Bellotti to Citizens United to Hobby Lobby to
see that Justice Ginsburg and Professor Garrett are not off target.
Although interpreted by some to be narrowly tailored to a specific type of
corporation (closely held), with a specific constitutionally protected purpose
(religion), a similar expansion of the Fourteenth Amendment is not farfetched. All
corporations are embodied with procedural due process rights under the Fourteenth
Amendment.'" The constitutional protections of these rights are relatively welldefined for individuals, yet states have been permitted to customize how they are
applied to corporations. States are required to ensure that constructive notice for all
persons is designed to result in a reasonable probability of actual notice, even when
it does result in a failure of receipt of notice. 200 For corporations, however, there are
statutory provisions that require them to consent to being deemed served when
constructive notice on the Secretary of State happens, making it impossible to
challenge improperly forwarded service. 20 ' This form of constructive notice cannot
be reasonably probable to result in actual notice. Its failure is impossible to
challenge. 2 0 2
Hobby Lobbfs method of interpreting corporate rights would invalidate this
form of constructive notice as a violation of due process. 203 just as the corporation
in Hobby Lobby were held to have the religious beliefs of the owners who were
improperly restricted by the Affordable Care Act ("ACA") 204 the shareholders or
trustees of a corporation that has ceased doing business in a state may be deemed to
deserve actual notice of service to avoid a violation of their due process rights.
States may not be able to treat a foreign corporation as it treats a foreign nation
when that corporation is made up of individual citizens vested with constitutional
rights that do not terminate when they aggregate as a corporation. Additionally,
other less onerous means of locating corporations and ensuring notice of suit not

'9 Santa Clara v. S. Pac. R. R. Co., 118 U.S. 394, 398 (1886).
See Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 333 (1976) (citations omitted) ("This Court
consistently has held that some form of hearing is required before an individual is finally deprived of a
property interest."); Mullane v. Cent. Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306, 314 (1950) (citations
omitted) ("An elementary and fundamental requirement of due process in any proceeding which is to be
accorded finality is notice reasonably calculated, under all the circumstances, to apprise interested parties
of the pendency of the action and afford them an opportunity to present their objections.").
201 See, e.g., ALASKA STAT. ANN. §10.06.780 (West 2016); DEL. CODE. ANN. tit. 8, § 381 (West
2016); HAW. REV. STAT. ANN. § 414-51 (West 2016); IOWA CODE ANN. § 490.1520 (West 2016);
LA. STAT. ANN. § 12:312(a) (2016); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 303.16 (West 2016); OKLA. STAT. ANN.
tit. 18, § 1135 (West 2016); 7 R.I. GEN. LAws § 7-1.2-1412 (West 2016).
2 See discussion infra Section III.A.
20 See discussion infra Section III.B.
a SeeBurwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2751, 2759-60,2775, 2785 (2014).
2
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only exist, but also are present elsewhere in corporate statutes. 205 The distinctions
between domestic and foreign corporations, as well as between natural persons and
corporations, may be viewed as inconsequential to the application of rights. And
thus unconstitutional under HobbyLobby and Citizens United206
III. CHANGES TO CORPORATE DUE PROCESS FOLLOWING CITIZENS UNITED

The disparate treatment of foreign corporations found in the corporate statutes
has long persisted. 207 Although the language of the Fourteenth Amendment and
case law interpreting it contradict this treatment in many cases, this treatment has
continued in states through reasoning that a foreign corporation is non-existent
until it is admitted to do business within a state.2 08 Disparate treatment is also a
result of beliefs that states have the ability to condition a corporation's admission
on terms that favor the state's citizens over the foreign corporation. 209 But Citizens
Unitedchanges how states must view all corporations. 2 10 Citizens United requires
that states look to the nature of the right being exercised, not to the party
exercising the right, making unconstitutional such disparate treatment premised on
a corporation's foreign nature.211

&

2 See, e.g., MODEL Bus. CORP. ACT § 5.04 (2010) (requiring service on the domestic corporation
at its principal office if service on its registered agent fails). Service is perfected on "(1) the date the
corporation receives the mail; (2) the date shown on the return receipt, if signed on behalf of the
corporation; or (3) five days after it deposit in the U.S. Mail, as evidenced by postmark, if mailed
postpaid and correctly addressed." Id. § 5.04(b). The MBCA notes that it does not prescribe the only
means for serving a corporation. Id. § 5.04(c). The process for service on a foreign corporation is the
same as a domestic corporation. Id. § 15.10.
206 See discussion infa Section III.B.
2 See, eg., W. & S. Life Ins. Co. v. State Bd. of Equalization of Ca., 451 U.S. 648, 656-58
(1981); Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Jenkins, 297 U.S. 629, 631-32 (1936); Washington ex re. Bond
Goodwin &Tucker v. Superior Court of Wash., 289 U.S. 361, 365-66 (1933) ("The power of the state
altogether to exclude the corporation, and the consequent ability to condition its entrance into the state,
distinguishes this case from those involving substituted service upon individuals, whose entrance into a
state may render them amenable to action there, only if the statute providing for substituted service
incorporates reasonable provision for giving the defendant notice of the initiation of litigation.")
(internal citations omitted). See alsodiscussion supra Section I. C.
2 See, e.g., St. Mary's Franco-Am. Petroleum Co., 203 U.S. at 191 ("It is argued that the act of
February 22, 1905, is invalid under the 14th Amendment, in that it deprives the company of liberty of
contract and property without due process of law, and denies it the equal protection of the laws. But, in
view of repeated decisions of this court, the contention is without merit. The state had the dear right to
regulate its own creations, and a fortiori, foreign corporations permitted to transact business within its
borders.").
Bank of Augusta v. Earle, 38 U.S. 519, 519 (1839); see also discussion supra Section I.B.
210 See discussion supra Section II.A.
21 See Citizens Unitel v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310, 349-57 (2010).
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Proper service of process for an individual requires following statutory
2 12
For a natural
requirements for service and, in most circumstances, actual notice.
person, constructive notice is rare, the requirements must be followed exactly, and,
in some circumstances, additional steps must be taken to increase the likelihood of
actual notice.2 1 3 Constructive notice to individuals should rarely result in a failure of
the party to receive notice of suit.214 When analyzing a failure, courts require that
the constructive notice be reasonably calculated to result in notice in all
circumstances, and, following the holding in Jones v. Flowers, require the party to
take reasonable measures after such notice fails. 215 Thus, for individuals,
constructive notice is a rare exception: not the rule. 216 For corporations, however,
constructive notice is the norm, not the exception. 21 7 A plaintiff must follow the
statutory requirements, but the requirements themselves impose unduly
218
burdensome restrictions, which may reward the bad-actor plaintiff.
This Part begins with an exploration of the current MBCA withdrawal
statutes.219 It explains how these statutes operate in practice, and how their
operation creates scenarios that prevent foreign corporations from receiving notice
of pending legal actions in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment procedural due
process requirements. Hobby Lobby and Citizens United have changed how the
rights of corporations are interpreted, making litigation of a successful Fourteenth
Amendment challenge greater. 0 This Part proposes that the statutes are now
unconstitutional under Citizens United and Hobby Lobby, which require states to
reconsider and reform restrictions on foreign corporations." In order to navigate
the new landscape of corporate rights cultivated by Citizens United, states may
look to other means of service on corporations already developed elsewhere in
corporate statutes. These other methods of service avoid the disparate outcome
currently experienced by foreign corporations while addressing the state concerns
with regard to elusive foreign corporations.

212 Mullane v. Cent. Hanover Bank & Tr. Co., 339 U.S. 306, 314 (1950) ("An elementary and
fundamental requirement of due process in any proceeding which is to be accorded finality is notice
reasonably calculated, under all the circumstances, to apprise interested parties of the pendency of the
action and afford them an opportunity to present their objections.").
213 Id. at 313-15.
214 SeeJones v. Flowers, 547 U.S. 220, 234-36 (2006) (holding "that the state should have taken
additional reasonable steps to notifyJones, if practicable to do so.").
215 Id
216 See id. at 238.
217 Under the MBCA, any time a corporation fails to designate an agent for service, or any time
following withdrawal, service is made by serving the Secretary of State who then forwards notice to the
corporation. MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT §§ 15.20, 5.04(b) (2010).
218 See infia notes 248-50 and accompanying text.
219 See discussion infr Section III.A.
20 See discussion infra Section 11I.B.
22 See discussion infra Section 111.C

80o

KENTUCKY LAW JOURNAL

VOL. 105

A. The MBCA WithdrawalStatutes in Practice
Jones v. Flowers is the most recent Supreme Court case to contemplate
constructive notice.222 In Fowers, the state of Arkansas sold a homeowner's
property for unpaid taxes after notice was unsuccessful on two occasionsY 3 The tax
commissioner sent notice by certified mail to the home, which was returned
unclaimed. 4 The Arkansas Commissioner argued that notice by mail was
adequate because it was sent to an address the property owner was required by
statute to keep up to date.2 5 The Supreme Court disagreed, holding that due
process requires additional follow up actions when the government is aware prior to
a taking of the property that notice has failed. 226 The Court inserts an aspect of the
MuZlane decision, noting "when notice is a person's due . . . [t]he means employed
must be such as one desirous of actually informing the absentee might reasonably
adopt to accomplish it."m Flowers reads Mullane to suggest that constructive
notice is the exception, not the rule, in all circumstances, even in the case of
substitute service.2

In corporate statutes, substitute service is the consequence of failure to
designate an agent for service or for withdrawing from the jurisdiction." The
corporation is at the mercy of the Secretary of State and must rely on the Secretary
of State to forward it any notice it may receive.230 This reliance does not foreclose
the corporation's constitutional rights, even though the corporation is deemed
served when service is received by the Secretary of State.23 Per Flowers, when a
party knows of the failure of service to reach the designated target before the taking
occurs, the party must take reasonable measures and exert effort to remedy the
situation.232 But failure to follow up when it is known that notice will not succeed,
as required by Mulane, is not reasonably calculated.2 3
In the current version of the MBCA, a loophole exists that allows a crafty
plaintiffs lawyer to manipulate the service of process requirements and obtain a

m SeeJones v. Flowers, 547 U.S. 220, 230-34 (2006).
224

Id. at 223.
at 226.
' Id. at 225 ("[W]hen mailed notice of tax sale is returned unclaimed, the state must take
additional reasonable steps to attempt to provide notice to the property owner before selling his
property, if it is practicable to do so.").
Id. at 238 (quoting Mullane v. Cent. Hanover Bank &Tr. Co., 339 U.S. 306,315 (1950)).

a Id

2

See id. at 238.

MODEL Bus. CORP. ACT § 5.04 (2010); MODEL Bus. CORP. ACT § 5.10 (2010).
See discussion supra Section II.A.
231 See Washington exrel. Bond & Goodwin & Tucker v. Superior Court of Wash., 289 U.S. 361,
363-6 (1933).
232 Rowets, 547 U.S. at 229-30 (2006).
23 See id. at 230-31; see also MODEL Bus. CORP. ACT § 5.04 (2010); MODEL Bus. CORP. ACT
§ 5.10 (2010); MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT § 15.20 (2010).
229
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default judgment in direct violation of the Flowersstandard.2 4 Section 15.20 of the
MBCA requires a foreign corporation to perpetually update its address with the
Secretary of State following withdrawal from a jurisdiction.3 s Under the MBCA, a
plaintiff can knowingly use the address listed in the certificate of withdrawal even if
it is aware that the actual business address has changed. 236 This outcome rewards
the plaintiffs actions with a default judgment." This outcome is directly in
conflict with Flowers, which opines that a plaintiff who knowingly designates an
address on file instead of a proper address is not taking the action of someone who
actually desires for notice to occur." It also creates a standard that is not imposed
on natural persons or domestic corporations.na Therefore, the resulting default
judgment-based purely on the corporation's foreign nature and prior acquiescence
to state control-is impermissible post- Citizens United.
Updating an address with the Secretary of State is not an unreasonable
requirement in most circumstances. 2 4o Commonly, a corporation monitors activity
24
in states where it has done business until all statutes of limitations have expired. 1
Where there is fill compliance with the applicable statute, the common corporate
practice of updating and monitoring a jurisdiction through the end of the liability
period for any causes of action in the jurisdiction is usually adequate protection
See discussion supra Section I. C.
MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT § 15.20 (2010).
See, e.g., Tankard-Smith, Inc. Gen. Contractors v. Thursby, 663 S.W.2d 473, 475-76 (Tex.
App. 1983) (holding the defendant responsible for the default judgment).
237
See id.
23 Jones v. Flowers, 547 U.S. 220, 229 (2006).
2 Compare Autodynamics, Inc. v. Vervoot, No. 14-10-00021-CV, 2011 WL 1260077, at *5-6
2

's
236

(Tex. App. Apr. 5, 2011) (holding that because there is no statutory requirement that the plaintiff
provide the nonresident's address for service under the Code, a plaintiff is not required to serve
defendant at an address other than the address registered with the Secretary of State, even if the plaintiff
knows the defendant has moved), with Mullane v. Cent. Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306, 314
(1950) (citations omitted) (holding in reference to natural persons that "[a]n elementary and
fundamental requirement of due process in any proceeding which is to be accorded finality is notice
reasonably calculated, under all the circumstances, to apprise interested parties of the pendency of the
action and afford them an opportunity to present their objections."). Domestic corporations are only
subjected to substitute service if service on the registered agent fails. In that circumstance, service is
made on the secretary of the corporation at the principal place of business. See, e.g., MODEL. BUS.

CORP. ACT § 5.04(b) (2010).
240 Corporations are subject to personal jurisdiction for all actions occurring while they are doing
business within a state. See Michalski, supra note 22, at 153. The same applies to any actions they take
when not registered to do business. See id. at 154-62. Because of the jurisdictional requirements,
corporations typically monitor a jurisdiction until the end of statutes of limitations periods. See supra
notes 132-42 and accompanying text.
241 See supra notes 132-42 and accompanying text. The MBCA and other codes impose a
continuing duty upon a corporation to monitor activity within jurisdictions where they have done
business. For this reasons, corporations tend to monitor litigation in a jurisdiction where they have done
business until it is reasonable to believe no risk of suit exists. Typically, this is until all applicable statutes
of limitations have expired.
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from default judgments.242 But for corporations engaged in activity that may result
in mass tort liability, the discovery rule may require the corporation to indefinitely
monitor every jurisdiction where business was conducted.2 3 Unlike natural persons,
corporations are capable of existing perpetually; therefore, an updating requirement
with no time limit or other condition can persist perpetually.
Generally, a limitations period does not begin to run until the plaintiff has a
"complete and present cause of action." 2' Thus, for some causes of action,
monitoring and updating for a specific number of years is not sufficient. 245 For a
plaintiff with a physical injury, for example, the injury may not be realized until
pain or other symptoms arise. 246 For some actions, it may take decades for a
potential plaintiff to even know that an injury has occurred.' For this reason,
jurisdictions toll or delay the statute of limitations until an injury is discovered. 2 48
This practice, known as the "discovery rule," operates to delay commencement of
the statute of limitations until the plaintiff knew or should have known about the
wrongful act and resulting injury. 249 The operation of the discovery rule results in a
scenario in which a foreign corporation that is mostly diligent may be denied its

242 See Harris v. Turchetta, 622 A.2d 487, 489 (R.I. 1993) (holding that "[t]hose who seek to
insulate themselves from liability by utilizing a corporate form of business enterprise have a
responsibility to see to it that reports are duly filed and that an attorney for service of process is
appointed."); supra note 240 and accompanying text.
243 "The discovery rule was first applied in medical malpractice cases, where the courts reasoned
that
the 'hidden' nature intrinsic to such cases necessitated the postponement of the statute of limitations
until the plaintiff could reasonably discover the existence of the malpractice. Gradually, the discovery
rile was applied to other forms of torts where the defects were not necessarily discernible at the time at
which the tort was committed." Sonja Larson, Annotation, Modern Status of the Application of
'DiscoveiyRule" to PostponeRunning ofLimitationsAgainst Actions Relating to Breach ofBuilding
and Construction Contracts, 33 A.L.R. 5th 1 § 2 (1995).
" Rawlings v. Ray, 312 U.S. 96, 98 (1941) (quoting Holloway v. Morris, 34 S.W.2d 750, 752
(Ark. 1931)).
245 See gencrally Larson, supra note 249 (describing that under the "discovery rule," the running of
the statute of limitations only begins when a person discovered they were harmed or with due diligence
should
have discovered the harm).
246

Id

See Merck & Co., Inc. v. Reynolds, 559 U.S. 633, 644-46 (2010).
Id.; see also Larson, supra note 243§ 2[a].
249 Although typically applied to situations involving bodily injury or disease, many jurisdictions
have applied the discovery rule to oil and gas leases as well as to tort or environmental events arising out
of drilling activities. See, e.g., Liles v. Producers' Oil Co., 99 So. 339, 342 (La. 1924) (concerning the
taking of oil and gas when land leased without co-tenant authority); Liles v. Barnhart, 93 So. 490, 493
(La. 1922) (same); Martin v. Texas Co., 90 So. 922, 923 (La. 1921) (oil lease); Findley v. Warren, 94 A.
69, 71 (Pa. 1915) (oil and gas lease); see also Larson, supra note 243, at § 2[a] ("Increasingly, the
discovery rile has been extended to defective construction cases, even where the plaintiff has proceeded
against the defendant builder, architect, or engineer on a breach of contract theory. Those courts which
have applied the discovery rule to these cases have sometimes analogized the hidden defect in the house
to the hidden nature of the tort in medical malpractice cases.").
247
248
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250 For example, if the hypothetical in the introduction was applied to a corporation and not an
individual, updating the state of Massachusetts for three years and having an address easily determined
by the general public would not prevent a default judgment. Partial compliance does not protect the
corporation when perpetual updating is required.
25 SeeMODEL Bus. CoRP. ACT. §15.20 CMT. (2010).
252

See, e.g., Campus Invs., Inc. v. Cullever, 144 S.W.3d 464, 466 (Tex. 2004). ("When substituted

service on a statutory agent is allowed, the designee is not an agent for servingbut for receiving process
on the defendant's behalf . . . A certificate . .. from the Secretary of State conclusively establishes that
process was served.") (internal citations omitted). Under the Texas version of the MBCA, when a party
served pursuant to the Business Code does not receive service due to its own negligent failure to comply
with updating requirements, it is deemed properly served when the Secretary of State receives and
forwards the complaint to the address on file. See id. This holding has been interpreted to apply in any
situation when a party is negligent in complying with statutory requirements to update its address. See,

e.g., Mabon Ltd. v. Afri-Carib Enters., 369 S.W.3d 809, 813 (Tex. 2012); Autodynanics, Inc. v.
Vervoot, No. 14-10-00021-CV, 2011 WL 1260077, at *5-6 (Tex. App. Apr. 5, 2011) (holding that
because there is no statutory requirement that the plaintiff provide the nonresident's address for service
under the Code, a plaintiff is not required to serve defendant at an address other than the address
registered with the Secretary of State, even if the plaintiff knows the defendant has moved); Glob. Serv.

Inc. v. G.W. Leasing Co., No. 01 -94-01234-CV, 1996 WL 608904, at *7-8 (Tex. App. Oct. 24, 1996).
In Harold-Elliott Co. v. K..P./Miller Realty Growth Fund I, the court held, reluctantly, that there is no
obligation to seek out the correct address from the Secretary of State. 853 S.W.2d 752, 755 (Tex. App.
1993). Although it provides a party to a lawsuit the right to ignore information it has concerning the
proper address and then obtain a no-notice default judgment, the substitute service statutes are
interpreted literally and other states have similar holdings to that in Harold-Eiott. See, e.g., Harris v.
Turchetta, 622 A.2d 487, 489 (R.I. 1993) (holding that "[t]hose who seek to insulate themselves from
liability by utilizing a corporate form of business enterprise have a responsibility to see to it that reports
are duly filed and that an attorney for service of process is appointed."); Bonneville Billing & Collection

v. Johnston, 987 P.2d 600, 601 (Utah 1999) (holding a defendant is deemed served when a plaintiff

.

served the defendant in accordance with requirements of applicable law regardless of whether other
service options are available).
" See, e.g., Cullever, 144 S.W.3d at 466 ("When substituted service on a statutory agent is
allowed, the designee is not an agent for serving but for receiving process on the defendant's behalf. . .
A certificate ... from the Secretary of State conclusively establishes that process was served.") (internal
citations omitted).
2
54 See id.

-

'

due process rights because of a simple oversight.250 For a corporation that
previously did business in an MBCA state, the statute of limitations is not adequate
for monitoring and updating in compliance with the statutes.25
In practice, the corporate withdrawal statutes are most problematic when a
foreign corporation properly withdraws from a jurisdiction, updates its address with
the Secretary of State until statutes of limitations have run in all causes of action,
but then actions later arise that are subject to the discovery rule.252 In this scenario,
the corporation remains liable for damages. 253 If it does not properly answer a suit,
it could receive a default judgment potentially depriving the corporation of property
without notice and in violation of Fourteenth Amendment procedural due process
requirements. 254 This identity-based treatment is different from the treatment of
domestic corporations and individuals.
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Generally, lack of notice is a valid ground for vacating a default judgment.2 55
But in many jurisdictions, a corporation's failure to comply with a statute regarding
service will negate this principle because the burden of the outcome of the
corporation's negligence falls on the corporation. 25 6 States perceive a failure to
comply with corporate statutory requirements as a decision made by the
corporation at its own peril.257 Plaintiffs are required to strictly follow the substitute
service statutes, or any default judgments obtained will be void. 258 However, courts
only require compliance with the applicable statute. 259 Courts do not require a
plaintiff to use the method most likely to result in actual notice. 260 Because of the
terms found in withdrawal statutes, absent fraud or mistake by the plaintiff, the
Secretary of State's certificate is "conclusive evidence that the Secretary of State
received service of process for [the corporation] and forwarded the service as
required by" statute.26 ' Service in this manner is sufficient even if the defendant
corporation does not receive notice of a pending action.262
Before Citizens United, the MBCA withdrawal statute was considered to have
a reasonable probability of notifying a defendant of service of process because it
required forwarding service to the last address on file with the Secretary of Statean address provided by the corporation. 263 Because the corporation accepted the
substitute service requirements following withdrawal as a condition of admission to
the state, failure to receive notice because of forwarding to an address that is no
longer correct, even under the operation of the discovery rule, could not invalidate a
25 A default judgment occurs when a party fails to take action in response to a suit. Generally, a
default judgment may be set aside if a party is not properly served as a judgment without notice violates
due process. Sec Peralta v. Heights Med. Ctr., Inc., 485 U.S. 80, 85-86 (1988).
256 See, e.g., Washington exrel. Bond & Goodwin & Tucker v. Superior Court of Wash., 289 U.S.
361, 365-66 (1933) ("The power of the state altogether to exclude the corporation, and the consequent
ability to condition its entrance into the state, distinguishes this case from those involving substituted
service upon individuals, whose entrance into a state may render them amenable to action there, only if
the statute providing for substituted service incorporates reasonable provision for giving the defendant
notice of the initiation of litigation.") (internal citations omitted).
2
Tankard-Smith, Inc. Gen. Contractors v. Thursby, 663 S.W.2d 473, 476 (Tex. App. 1983)
(holding the defendant responsible for the default judgment).
" See Harold-Elliott Co. v. K..P./Miller Realty Growth Fund I, 853 S.W.2d 752, 755 (Tex. App.
1993) (discussing literal interpretation of the service statute).
2 Id. (holding, reluctantly, that there is no obligation to seek out the correct address from the
Secretary of State); Harris v. Turchetta, 622 A.2d 487, 489 (R.I. 1993) (holding that "[t]hose who seek
to insulate themselves from liability by utilizing a corporate form of business enterprise have a
responsibility to see to it that reports are duly filed and that an attorney for service of process is
appointed."); Bonneville Billing & Collection v. Johnston, 987 P.2d 600, 601 (Utah 1999) (holding a
defendant is deemed served when a plaintiff served the defendant in accordance with requirements of
applicable law regardless of whether other service options are available).
260 See supra note 205 and accompanying text.
261 See, e.g., G.F.S. Ventures, Inc. v. Harris, 934 S.W.2d 813, 818 (Tex. App. 1996) (citing
Capitol
Brick Inc. v. Fleming Mfg. Co., 722 S.W.2d 399, 401 (Tex. 1986)).
See, e.g., id. (citing Capitol Brick Inc. v. Fleming Mfg. Co., 722 S.W.2d 399, 401 (Tex. 1986).
263 See Washington exrd Bond & Goodwin & Tucker v. Superior Court of Wash., 289 U.S. 361,
363-66 (1933).
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Constructive Notice Following Citizens United
default judgment. 2" This result-that a corporation is deprived of property without
notice through a loophole enabling plaintiffs to ignore the actual knowledge he or
she may have about a corporation's correct address-not only contradicts the
2 65
holding in Citizens United, but also the requirements of Flowers.
Notably, this is not the outcome for a foreign corporation that never registers to
do business in the state, nor for a domestic corporation. Under corporation statutes,
the duty for serving such a corporation falls on the plaintiff, who must serve the
corporation's principle place of business or home office. 2 66 For a domestic
corporation, substitute service only comes into play if the corporation fails to
designate an agent for service. 26 7 Even then, the plaintiff must request that the
Secretary of State serve the defendant corporation at its home office, principle place
of business, or other location reasonably certain to result in actual notice. 26 8 The
corporation is still deemed served when service on the Secretary of State occurs, but
the failure to designate a proper address where notice is likely to actually occur is
attributed to the plaintiff. 26 9 But for the foreign corporation, properly registered
and withdrawn, plaintiffs are not held responsible for providing an incorrect
address for forwarding service.270 In this scenario, if the plaintiff chooses an address
that is not in fact a proper corporate address, the failure of the corporation to
receive notice is attributed to the defendant if that error is due to the defendant's
27
failure to provide a current address to the Secretary of State. 1
'1 See Tankard-Smith, Inc. Gen. Contractors v. Thursby, 663 S.W.2d 473, 476 (Tex. App. 1983)
(holding the defendant responsible for the default judgment).
'
Id.; Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310, 349-57 (2010); Jones v. Fowers, 547 U.S. 220, 229
(2006).
'6
See, e.g., MODEL Bus. CORP. ACT. § 5.04 (2010) (requiring service on the domestic
corporation at its principal office if service on the registered agent fails).
7
See id.
268 See id. (requiring service on the domestic corporation at its principal office if service on its
registered agent fails). Service is perfected on "(1) the date the corporation receives the mail; (2) the date
shown on the return receipt, if signed on behalf of the corporation; or (3) five days after it deposit in the
U.S. Mail, as evidenced by postmark, if mailed postpaid and correctly addressed." Id. § 5.04(b). The
MBCA notes that it does not prescribe the only means for serving a corporation. Id. § 5.04(c). The
process for service on a foreign corporation is the same as a domestic corporation. Id. § 15.10.
269 See, e.g., Campus Invs., Inc. v. Cullever, 144 S.W.3d 464, 466 (Tex. 2004). ("When substituted
service on a statutory agent is allowed, the designee is not an agent for servingbut for receivingprocess

on the defendant's behalf. . . . A certificate . . . from the Secretary of State conclusivel establishes that

process was served.") (internal citations omitted). Under the Texas version of the MBCA, when a party
served pursuant to the Business Code does not receive service due to its own negligent failure to comply
with updating requirements, it is deemed properly served when the Secretary of State receives and
forwards the complaint to the address on file, even if that address is inaccurate. See id; supra note 252
and accompanying text.
27
o Washington exrel. Bond & Goodwin & Tucker v. Superior Court of Wash., 289 U.S. 361, 365
(1933); see also supra note 252 and accompanying text.
271 Tankard-Smith, Inc. Gen. Contractors v. Thursby, 663 S.W.2d 473, 476 (Tex. App. 1983)
(holding the defendant responsible for the default judgment); see also supra note 252 and accompanying
text.
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B. The Valdity of WithdrawalStatutes Post-Citizens United
Citizens United changed the parameters of what is reasonable in state
regulation of corporations.2 7 2 Prior to Citizens United, the likelihood of a
corporation not receiving notice was balanced in part with the interest of the state
and the possibility of utilizing more accurate procedures .273 If a foreign corporation
failed to receive notice due to its own failure to comply with corporate withdrawal
statutes, the result would not be unconstitutional.274 Post- Citizens United, at least
one scenario resulting from the operation of the MBCA withdrawal statute is
unconstitutional. 275 Even if one deems the service requirements to be reasonable,
they result in different outcomes based solely on whether the corporation is
domestic or foreign.2 76 With Citizens Unitedin mind, it is difficult to envision a
scenario in which denying a foreign corporation due process merely because of its

status would be constitutionally permissible.
Flowers strengthens the likelihood of a successful challenge to the withdrawal
statutes. If a plaintiff knows that an address is incorrect before the taking of
property, they are required to take additional reasonable measures.277 A plaintiff
who serves a corporation by substitute service will have knowledge whether an
address for service is incorrect. When service on a corporation fails to reach that
corporation, a plaintiff is made aware of the failure of substitute service when the
Secretary of State receives notice that the mail containing a corporation's notice is
returned unclaimed.278 The ease of locating information on corporations means that
a plaintiff will also know of an alternative and correct address for a corporation with
a minimal search. Thus, it is reasonable for the plaintiff to forward service to the
correct address before pursuing a default judgment. Such conduct is indicative of a
party who intends to inform its opponent of a pending suit.2 79
In addition to considering Fowers, post- Citizens United courts must also
review the application of the Fourteenth Amendment based on the nature of the
rights it guarantees-not the nature of the citizen exercising the right.280
Corporations have procedural due process rights that stay with them regardless of

2 See discussion supra Section II.A.
273 SeeBank of Augusta v. Earle, 38 U.S. 519, 519 (1839); Seediscussion supra Section I.B.
27 Tankard-Smith, 663 S.W.2d at 476; see also discussion supra Sections II.B., III.A.
275

Jones v. Flowers, 547 U.S. 220, 229 (2006).; see also discussion supra Section II.A.

276 See supra notes 252-271 and accompanying text.
277 See Flowers, 547 U.S. at 234.
27
2

1Id. at 231, 234-35.

See Flowers, 547 U.S. at 232.
2 See discussion supra Section II.A.
1
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jurisdictional presence and that are equal to those of natural citizens.2 8 1 Once a
foreign corporation meets the threshold requirements for entry to one United
States jurisdiction, subsequent states may not arbitrarily infringe on that
corporation's rights merely because of its corporate status. 28 2 Citizens United
prevents a state from making a distinction between a foreign and domestic
corporation when imposing requirements for substitute service. 2 83
The current treatment of foreign corporations is given its force by the holding
in Earle, which declares a foreign corporation non-existent until admitted to a
jurisdiction. 2 8 This fiction cannot persist after Citizens United. Post-Citizens
United, a corporation is, like a natural person, born with rights that must be
recognized by all jurisdictions. 28 5 A state may not deny any person due process
merely because it is "born" outside of its borders. Once a corporation is founded
and chartered, it should be considered "born" with rights like a natural person that
are in force regardless of the jurisdiction. The fiction of the artificial corporation
that enters a state without rights until granted an authorization to do business in
the state should no longer exist.
Under the aggregate theory articulated in Hobby Lobby, a court can also
invalidate withdrawal statutes based on the procedural due process rights of the
citizens who make up corporations.2 8 6 Applying a rubric similar to the Court's in
Hobby Lobby, the citizens who have contracted to make up a corporation may not
have their rights foreclosed simply because they have united in a corporate form. A
state cannot contractually deprive an individual of the right to receive notice of
pending actions. Nor can a state deem non-citizens served by service on its own
Secretary of State. Because a state cannot impose these conditions on the citizens
that make up a corporation, a state also cannot impose these conditions on a
corporation itself.
A comparison of the outcomes based on the identity of the persons making up
the corporation also make it dear that the withdrawal statutes do not stand up to
the tests found in Citizens United. A default judgment on a similarly situated
281 Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310, 349-56 (2010); see Covington & Lexington Tpk. Rd.
Co. v. Sandford, 164 U.S. 578, 592 (1896) ("It is now settled that corporations are persons, within the
meaning of the constitutional provisions forbidding the deprivation of property without due process of
law, as well as a denial of the equal protection of the laws.") (citations omitted); Minneapolis & St.
Louis Ry. Co. v. Beckwith, 129 U.S. 26, 28 (1889) (extending Fourteenth Amendment procedural due
process to corporations); see generally Santa Clara v. S. Pac. R. R. Co., 118 U.S. 394 (1886); Garrett,
supra note 76 (providing a survey of corporate due process rights).
282 See Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2751, 2771-72 (2014); see discussion supra
Part II.B.
253 Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310,342-55 (2010); seediscussion supra PartII.
284 Bank of Augusta v. Earle, 38 U.S. 519, 525 (1839); see supra notes 95-103 and accompanying
text.
25 See discussion supra Section II.A.
236 HobbyLobby, 134 S. Ct. at 2768; see discussion supra Section II.B.

88

KENTUCKY LAWJOURNAL

Vol. 105

individual would not be constitutional.2" The courts would not uphold a default
judgment based solely on service of process made on an address at which the
individual no longer resides and found not through diligence on the part of the
plaintiff, but instead upon reliance on what was contained in just one record with
one government entity.288 The courts would also not permit a default judgment
based on substitute service on a domestic corporation at a prior place of business. A
default judgment on a foreign corporation based on forwarding notice of service to
an improper address is not reasonably calculated to provide that foreign corporation
with notice in a world in which all corporations must be treated as equal to a
natural persons.
Expanding the Fourteenth Amendment's procedural due process rights to treat
a corporation like a natural person does not require logistical leaps or manipulation
of precedent. The history of corporate due process rights, the standard of reviewing
such rights, and the recent decision in Citizens United make equalizing the
operation of service of process statutes a natural outcome. Due process has been
confirmed repeatedly as a right that applies to corporations; it is a natural extension
of recent precedent for due process rights to become more equal to those exercised
by natural persons. 289 Citizens United held that corporations have First
Amendment rights because corporations can speak. 290 Hobby Lobby held that
corporations have religious beliefs because its owners have religious beliefs.291
Similarly, the Court should find that a corporation has the same due process rights
as an individual because they can be sued and deprived of property.
C. Proposalto Reform CorporateService ofProcess Under the New
Regulatory Regime ofCitizens United
The right to receive notice and be heard when faced with litigation is a
fundamental right all can understand. Before property may be taken away by a
governmental activity, the Due Process Clause requires that individuals be given an
opportunity to protect their property interests. 29 2 For purposes of court
See, e.g., Jones v. Flowers, 547 U.S. 220, 232 (2006).
See id. at 225 (holding that the state could not rely on the address on file with the commissioner
and the plaintiffs duty under law to update the address).
m See, e.g., Covington & Lexington Tpk. Rd. Co. v. Sandford, 164 U.S. 578, 592 (1896) ("It is
now settled that corporations are persons, within the meaning of the constitutional provisions
forbidding the deprivation of property without due process of law, as well as a denial of the equal
protection- of the laws.") (citations omitted); Minneapolis & St. Louis Ry. Co. v. Beckwith, 129 U.S. 26,
28 (1889) (extending Fourteenth Amendment procedural due process to corporations). See generally
Santa Clara v. S. Pac. R. R. Co., 118 U.S. 394 (1886).
290 Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310, 353 (2010). See supra notes 158-163 and accompanying
text.
291 Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2751, 2769 (2014). See supra notes 175-179
and accompanying text.
292
SeeU.S. CONST. amend. XIV § 1.
287

288
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proceedings, the Due Process Clause has been interpreted to require that a party be
293
given the opportunity to have its day in court before a neutral tribunal. Powers
imposes additional requirements for providing adequate notice, mandating that
parties take additional steps when they have additional time, additional
information, and when reasonable additional measures are available. 294 For this
reason, the treatment of foreign corporations that have withdrawn from doing
business in a state was questionable even before Citizens United.
Because corporations are non-corporeal, they must always be served through
either a registered agent for service or through an officer of the corporation with
the authority to accept service.295 The lack of a physical body requires states to
designate where a party may serve a corporate defendant-either a principal place
hen
of business, home office, or the address indicated by the registered agent.296
a domestic corporation or a foreign corporation that has failed to register with-the
state does not designate an agent or provide information to the Secretary of State,
corporate statutes allow a plaintiff to serve a corporation by serving the Secretary of
State, indicating that corporation's principal place of business or home office
address.297 These conditions are reasonably calculated and necessary for providing
plaintiffs with a means of recovery against a defendant that is lacking in a physical
form. Citizens United does not invalidate these steps, which are necessary due to
the nature of the corporate form; it is only concerned with inequalities based solely
on a corporation's nature. States may bring themselves into compliance with
Citizens United by eliminating perpetual updating requirements-treating
withdrawn foreign corporations like all other foreign and domestic corporations.
The current MBCA withdrawal provisions are unconstitutional. This does not,
however, mean the provisions cannot be structured in a way that satisfies due

29
See Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 348-49 (1976) (citing Joint Anti-Fascist Refugee
Comm. v. McGrath, 341 U.S. 123, 168 (1951)).
294 Jones v. Flowers, 547 U.S. 220,234-35 (2006). 17owers may be read to impose a Mathews-style
balancing test to notice. See id.; Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 332 (1976). The Flowers Court
notes that when more is at stake, more effort should be made to perfect notice. See Flowers, 547 U.S. at
234-35. Professor Borchers advocates for eliminating the lines of distinction between substantive,
procedural, and administrative due process. Patrick J. Borchers, Essay, Jones v. Flowers: An Essay on a
Unided Theory ofProceduralDue Process, 40 CREIGHTON L. REv. 343, 347-48 (2007) ("Currently,
the Supreme Court and commentators think of these three lines of cases in isolation. The Jones
decision, for example, cites cases that are mostly in the Mulane line. State-court jurisdiction cases rely
almost exclusively on cases in the 'minimum contacts' line of cases. The 'reasonable procedures' cases in
the Mathews line are essentially all lumped under the heading of 'administrative due process.'
Commentary, including my own, has mostly treated the lines as distinct. But what if we began to think
of these as one, rather than several issues? My contention is that doing so would promote analytical
clarity.") (internal footnotes omitted).
295 See supra note 129-130 and accompanying text.
296 See supra note 129-130 and accompanying text
2 See supra note 129-130 and accompanying text.
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process. 298 Alternative means of proper substitute service on a corporation exist in
other corporate statutes and even in other sections of the MBCA. 299 By equalizing
the treatment of foreign corporations that have never registered to do business
within a state, corporations incorporated in a state, and foreign corporations that
have registered to do business in a state but have withdrawn, the MBCA can be
corrected to comply with the heightened constitutional requirements of Citizens
United.
Some may view a complete elimination of constructive notice on the Secretary
of State as the natural outcome of the application of recent precedents to corporate
statutes, but this is not the best result. Treating the corporation as anything more
than an artificial, legal construct results in legal inequalities that favor corporations
over natural persons. For instance, following Citizens United to this conclusion,
and eliminating all distinctions between natural persons and corporations, may
protect the corporate right to due process-but it also allows corporations to use
withdrawal to evade legal responsibility. While the withdrawal statutes, even preCitizens United, created a scenario that allowed plaintiffs to act in bad faith when
serving foreign corporations, this foul outcome does not require the elimination of
states' ability to impose conditions on a foreign corporation that could not be
applied to natural persons. The differences between natural persons and
corporations-such as a corporation's lack of a physical body that may be servedjustify states' ability to mandate different service of process requirements to
accommodate those differences.
The states that employ the MBCA, requiring corporations to update an address
for a set number of years, balance state concerns based on the non-corporeal nature
and perpetual life of corporations against the requirements of due process.3oo By
merely linking the updating requirement to the statutes of limitations for causes of
action arising out of corporations' conduct in a jurisdiction, statutes with timelimited provisions do not impose an additional burden on foreign corporations.
This practice provides protection to states' residents and ensures corporations
receive notice of suit against them. These modified MBCAs are still at risk,
however, of running afoul of the Flowers standard. The policy of deeming a
corporation served and allowing a plaintiff to perfect service by serving the
Secretary of State does not completely eliminate the risk of a bad actor plaintiff. If a
specific year requirement is imposed, the holdings of Citizens United, Hobby
Lobby, and Fowers would jointly require additional attempts at service if notice
initially fails.

298 See, e.g., supra note 205 and accompanying text (discussing alternative means for service
available under the Model Business Corporation Act).
' See, e.g., supra note 205 and accompanying text (discussing alternative means for service
available under the MBCA).
" See OR. REv. STAT. ANN. § 60.734 (West 2016) (5 years); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 11A, § 15.20
(West 2016) (7 years); supra note 136 and accompanying text.
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State withdrawal statutes that require a plaintiff to serve the Secretary of State
indicating a corporation's principal place of business or home office address are
most effective post- Citizens Unitedo' When a corporation that is registered to do
business within the state fails to designate an agent for service, the MBCA provides
for service on the corporation via the secretary of the corporation at its principle
place of business.3 0 2 This requirement applies equally to domestic and foreign
corporations. Using a corporation's principle place of business is a method familiar
to parties and reasonably calculated to reach the corporation. These statutes
equalize all corporations, place the onus of indicating an incorrect address on the
plaintiff, and ensure that the foreign corporation may not evade liability by simply
withdrawing from the jurisdiction.
Due process requires that constructive notice be reasonably calculated in all
circumstances to result in actual notice. 3 A combination of beliefs with regard to
corporate theory-and, in particular, the nature of a foreign corporation's rightshave permitted states to impose conditions on out-of-state corporations that are
different from the standards imposed on domestic corporations and natural
persons. This can result in an unconstitutional failure of foreign corporations'
notice of suit.3 ' Currently, states are permitted to deem a foreign corporation as
served when service is made upon the Secretary of State, and, if notice is forwarded
to an incorrect address due to a foreign corporation's failure to maintain an updated
address with the Secretary of State, the impact of such failure falls on the
3 05
corporation, not the party attempting to notify the corporation. This outcome
not only disregards the knowledge of the party attempting to serve the corporation
6
in violation of the Supreme Court's decision in Jones v. Flowers,"o but it also
imposes a method of service that differs from the requirements for domestic

301 California arguably has the most unique treatment of foreign corporations. After withdrawal,
foreign corporations are served by any means allowable. CAL. CORP. CODE § 2114 (West 2016). This
approach treats the foreign corporation that has surrendered its right to do business in the state the same
as a domestic corporation or a foreign corporation that was never admitted. California also takes a more
liberal approach in providing relief from default judgments. Under the California Code of Civil
Procedure: "The court may, upon any terms as may be just, relieve a party or his or her legal
representative from a judgment, dismissal, order, or other proceeding taken against him or her through
his or her mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or excusable neglect. Application for this relief shall be
accompanied by a copy of the answer or other pleading proposed to be filed therein, otherwise the
application shall not be granted, and shall be made within a reasonable time, in no case exceeding six
months, after the judgment, dismissal, order, or proceeding was taken." CAL. CIv. PROC. CODE §
473(b) (West 2016).
-n MODEL Bus. CORP. ACT § 5.04 (2010).
' Mullane v. Cent. Hanover Bank & Tr. Co., 339 U.S. 306, 314 (1950); see discussion supra
Section L.B.
* See discussion supra Sections III.B. and III.C.
* See discussion supra Section IIl.A.
n SeeJones v. Flowers, 547 U.S. 220, 232 (2006).
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corporations."o' When the Flowers requirements are combined with a view of the
corporation as equal to a natural person, the MBCA withdrawal statutes fail to
satisfy constitutional guarantees of due process under the Citizens United standard.
A consideration of the outcome under the Flowers standard makes the statutory
scheme constitutionally problematic. By adopting the same service of process
requirements found elsewhere in corporate statutes, however, states may come in
compliance with Citizens United
CONCLUSION

This Article considers one application of the Citizens United holding, and
concludes that the decision renders unconstitutional the substitute service as it is
applied through the Model Business Corporation Act. The issue presented by
Citizens United is whether the MBCA and other corporate statutes accurately
reflect the new level of equality between natural persons and corporations.
Following the Citizens United, states must look to the nature of rights, not the
party exercising them, when determining the permissible level of state restriction
on corporate rights. For this reason, states must reexamine the withdrawal statutes
to ensure that the requirements do not produce an inequitable and unconstitutional
result.
Citizens Unitedrequires states to view corporations and natural persons equally
when determining the constitutional limits on state authority. The Citizens United
and Hobby Lobby prohibitions of identity-based limits on constitutional rights
require states to examine the nature of the right themselves, not the nature of the
person exercising the rights. Somewhat controversially, this Article proposes that
these holdings are an indication of the direction of the Roberts Court; thus, it is
reasonable to assume that the Court will extend corporate due process rights to
require an equal probability of notice. Considering the Court's recent decision on
procedural due process, Fowers, this outcome is particularly accurate in
circumstances, like those permissible under the MBCA, which benefit a plaintiff
with actual knowledge of better means of service-and which not only draw
distinctions between persons and corporations, but also between foreign and
domestic corporations. Correcting this disparity will not impose an undue burden
on the states, as alternative means of service already exists elsewhere in corporate
statutes that will allow states to treat all corporations equally. States that have
adopted the MBCA may remedy the disparity in two ways: (1) by requiring parties
to serve .foreign corporations at their principal place of business or home office,
similar to service of process on domestic corporations that have failed to designate a
registered agent; or (2) by only requiring the foreign corporation to provide an
address for service for a more reasonable, set number of years instead of in
perpetuity. Both of these methods satisfy the constitutional protections of corporate
3 See MODEL Bus. CORP. ACT § 5.04 (2010); supra notes 203-206 and accompanying text.
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rights and service of process imposed by Citizens United and Flowers, balance
states' interests with the rights of foreign corporations, and do not impose
impractical or unreasonable means of service.

